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NOTES
AMERICA'S DARK LITTLE SECRET:
CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISION OF THE
1994 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
Jennifer Lynn Crawford+
The United States Constitution grants distinct powers to each of the
three separate branches of government.1 Among Congress's enumerated
2
powers is the sole authority to regulate commerce among the states.
+ J.D. candidate, May 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. The Constitution grants Congress a variety of
powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (power to establish laws regarding bankruptcy
and naturalization of citizens); id. cl. 5. (power to coin money); id. cl. 7 (power to establish
post offices); id. cl. 8 (power to grant intellectual property rights); id. cl. 11 (power to de-
clare war); id. cl. 14 (power to regulate naval forces).
2. See id. cl. 3. The Constitution grants Congress the power "[tjo regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
Id. Commerce played a central role in the early development of the nation and the Con-
stitution and was of primary focus at the Constitutional Convention. See 1 ALBERT J.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 310-11 (1916) (explaining that at the time of
the Constitutional Convention, states treated each other as if each was a foreign nation by
creating discriminatory restrictions on commerce); CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25-27 (2d ed. 1954) (discussing the importance of the
federal government's control over interstate commerce to promote industry and prohibit
commercial barriers between the states); Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflec-
tions on the Congressional Commerce Power, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 901, 905 (1987) (noting that
Constitutional Convention delegates recognized the need for federal supervision of inter-
state commerce); David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause: A Time for Reevaluation, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1069, 1077 (1996) (stating that the Commerce Clause's purpose is "to main-
tain free trade among the States").
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The states may not infringe upon3 this plenary and absolute power.' In-
herent in the commerce power is the ability to prohibit commerce that
adversely affects the national welfare Broadly defined, commerce in-
cludes not only traditional concepts of commercial activity, but also non-
6commercial activities that have some effect on commerce.
3. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1063, at 513 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) (highlighting that a grant of
absolute power to Congress necessarily precludes any state action). See generally Barron
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (addressing the reasons behind
constitutional limitations on the federal government's power). In his commentaries, Jus-
tice Story stated that absent congressional regulation in a particular area of commerce, the
states retained the power to act in that area unless such regulation was incongruous with
Congress's commerce power. See 2 STORY, supra, § 1069, at 517; see also Muriel Morisey
Spence, What Congress Knows and Sometimes Doesn't Know, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 653,
657 (1996) (noting that states have the power to regulate in those areas which the Consti-
tution does not address). If Congress later passed a law regulating commerce which would
conflict with existing state law, federal law would prevail. See 2 STORY, supra, § 1069, at
517; cf CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 25-26 (1960) (discussing the development of the Supreme Court's doc-
trine on the interaction of federal and state law, and stating that at one time the Supreme
Court held that when the two conflict, federal law trumped state law). But cf California v.
Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) (explaining that "the fact of identity does not mean the
automatic invalidity of state measures").
4. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (stressing the singular and
plenary powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause); see also Brown v. Houston, 114
U.S. 622, 630 (1885) (affirming the absolute power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce); 2 STORY, supra note 3, § 1063, at 513 (commenting on Congress's exclusive
power to regulate interstate commerce); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 306 (2d ed. 1988) (interpreting the Commerce Clause as
providing Congress with regulatory powers subject only to constitutional prohibitions).
5. See Edward S. Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce: A Crucial Con-
stitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 477, 477 (1933) (discussing Congress's regulatory
power to pass legislation to promote national welfare); see also 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA
& JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 4.1, at 356 (2d ed. 1992) (commenting on Congress's ability to restrict the
application of certain state laws which adversely. affect interstate commerce); III
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, vol. 2, at 615 (1968) (stating that Congress has the power to prohibit commerce
adversely affecting social, economic, or moral values).
6. See Champion v. Ames (the Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1903). In the
years surrounding the Lottery Case, federal courts increasingly indicated a willingness to
uphold federal regulation in areas that affected public health and welfare. See, e.g., Hoke
v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913) (providing that Congress may prohibit white
slave traffic under the Mann Act as a means to defeat "the motive and evils of its manu-
facture"); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58, 60 (1911) (upholding the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906's ban on the transportation of impure and unwholesome
food); United States v. Popper, 98 F. 423, 424 (N.D. Cal. 1899) (affirming Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the interstate carriage of contraceptive
devices).
In the Lottery Case, for example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal act
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The Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation of three broad
areas of commerce.7 First, Congress can regulate the channels of inter-
state commerce, including the interstate transportation of goods, serv-
ices, or people.8 Regulation of the channels of interstate commerce may
include the prohibition of shipments of stolen goods or kidnapped per-
sons.9 Second, Congress has the power to regulate or protect the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce from any intrastate threat.'t For ex-
ample, Congress can regulate highways, bridges, and railroads as
instrumentalities of interstate commerce even if each is located solely
within one state." Finally, Congress can regulate those intrastate activi-
ties that have a substantial relation to or substantial effect on interstate
prohibiting the interstate movement of lottery tickets. See The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at
363. The Court acknowledged that the Act had a closer connection to public morals than
interstate commerce. See id. at 356-57. Therefore, although Congress's intent may have
been to prohibit such unwholesome activity, the Court upheld the regulation because the
movement of lottery tickets actually affected interstate commerce. See id. at 357; see also
CRAIG R. DUCAT & HAROLD W. CHASE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: POWERS
OF GOVERNMENT 363 (5th ed. 1992) (noting that the commerce power provides for the
ancillary regulation of health, safety, and welfare); III SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, vol. 2, at
615 (noting moral, social, and economic purposes for Commerce Clause regulation).
7. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (acknowledging that
Congress may regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well
as "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce"); Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981) (same); Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146,150 (1971) (same); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Conn. 1996)
(same); see also 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 4.8, at 394-98 (discussing the dif-
ferent areas of commerce regulation).
8. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-98 (1964) (finding that business
activities fell under Commerce Clause regulation when products used in the business were
shipped through the channels of interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (noting that the movement of people across state
lines constitutes interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)
(recognizing congressional power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce).
9. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (listing examples of congressional regulation of the
channels of interstate commerce).
10. See id. (reporting that interstate shipments are "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce that Congress may protect from events such as theft or sabotage); Southern Ry.
Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911) (finding railroad lines to be instrumentalities
of interstate commerce regardless of whether the trains using the rails traveled out of
state). The Court in United States v. E.C. Knight Co. explained that Congress could regu-
late the transportation of goods between states because the goods formed an actual part of
the total interstate transaction. See 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895).
11. See Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 16 (1953) (recognizing Congress's
authority to regulate highways); Overstreet v..North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 130 (1943)
(bridges); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (the Shreveport Rate Case), 234
U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (railroads); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588-89 (3d Cir.)
(upholding a federal carjacking statute on the basis that Congress may regulate the motor
vehicle as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, regardless of where the car is oper-
ated), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995).
1997]
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commerce. 12 If such activity is considered commercial, it is irrelevant
whether the effect on interstate commerce is direct or indirect, as long as
an actual effect exists. 3 If such intrastate activity is not commercial in
nature, the Court requires a more direct connection, not merely an effect
on interstate commerce in order to uphold congressional regulation. 4
In the past decade of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has struggled to establish a practical definition of "effect" as ap-
plied to the third area of congressional regulation. 5 The Court has
sought, in some opinions, to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect"
effects on commerce, while other opinions have focused on the magni-
tude of the effect. 16 Most recently, the Supreme Court has attempted to
clarify the third area of regulation by rejecting a strict "effect" theory,
and narrowing its analysis to find regulation permissible if an activity
12. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 189-90 (1968) (affirming federal regulation
of intrastate activities having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce), overruled
by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (same).
13. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995) (discussing the regulation
of intrastate activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce); Wirtz, 392
U.S. at 196-97 (affirming federal regulation of intrastate activities engaged in by a state
and having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce); Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S.
at 37 (defining the "substantially affects" analysis used to determine whether Congress
may regulate activities that are "intrastate in character").
14. Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (requiring that Congress articulate clear findings on
how a non-commercial activity affects interstate commerce).
15. See, e.g., id. at 559 (noting confusion in the third category of regulation regarding
the difference between "affect" and "substantially affect"); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) (stating that a regulated activity need only "affect,"
not "substantially affect," interstate commerce); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)
(commenting that the ultimate decision as to whether an activity "substantially affects"
interstate commerce remains a judicial decision, regardless of congressional findings). See
generally Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995) (providing an
overview of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
16. Compare A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-49
(1935) (determining that Congress's regulation of an intrastate industry was in excess of its
power because the regulated activity was too indirectly related to interstate commerce),
with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (concluding that "the proper test... [is] whether the regulated
activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce"), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
128-29 (1942) (utilizing a cumulative effect theory to determine the magnitude of an activ-
ity on interstate commerce), Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the New Deal era
primarily interpreted the Commerce Clause in relation to the Tenth Amendment. See 1
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 4.8, at 394. The Tenth Amendment reads: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Once the Court began to accept the Commerce Clause as an independent grant of author-
ity, it moved away from the distinctions made in Schechter concerning direct and indirect
effects on commerce. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 4.8, at 394.
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"substantially affects" interstate commerce.17 Absent from the Supreme
Court's analysis, however, is a clear, standardized test for lower courts to
follow. 8 As a result, lower courts continue to struggle to find a working
definition of the term "substantially affect." 9
One of the latest judicial inquiries into the area of interstate commerce
concerns the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) ° Congress
enacted VAWA as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act, a small portion of the federal Omnibus Crime Package."
Congress promulgated the Act to comprehensively address problems as-
sociated with the nationwide escalation of violence against women." The
17. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (refusing to extend the commerce power to regulate
activities having only a remote or trivial effect on interstate commerce and declaring that
the proper test to use when analyzing an exercise of commerce power is "whether the
regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce"); see also Rachel Elizabeth
Smith, Note, United States v. Lopez: Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power and Re-
membering Federalism, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1459, 1495-96 (1996) (advocating support for
the Lopez Court's reasoning in invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
18. See John P. Frantz, Recent Development, The Reemergence of the Commerce
Clause as a Limit on Federal Power: United States v. Lopez, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
161, 161 (1995) (stating that the meaning of "affects" versus "substantially affects" re-
mains unclear despite the Lopez ruling); cf Tom Stacy, What's Wrong With Lopez, 44 U.
KAN. L. REV. 243, 261 (1996) (arguing that Lopez fails to resolve the conflicts in modern
federalism); Alan R. Arkin, Comment, Inconsistencies in Modern Federalism Jurispru-
dence, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1569, 1599 (1996) (reasoning that Lopez illustrated "the inconsis-
tencies of modern federalism jurisprudence").
19. See Deanne L. Dissinger, Recent Decision, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 507, 518-19 (1996)
(noting that a court which upheld the constitutionality of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992
applied a modified "substantially affects" test); cf. Lan Hoang, Note, Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248: The Controversy Behind the Remedy, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 128, 166-68 (1996) (advocating the constitutionality of the Freedom of Ac-
cess to Clinic Entrances Act, despite the Court's decision in Lopez).
20. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.). VAWA is divided into
five specific areas addressing violence against women: Title I, Safe Streets for Women; Ti-
tle II, Safe Homes for Women; Title II1, Civil Rights for Women; Title IV, Safe Campuses;
and, Title V, Equal Justice for Women in the Courts. See id.
21. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, and 42 U.S.C.). The
Omnibus Crime Package includes other provisions concerning DNA identification, drug-
free truck stops, driver's privacy, and child abuse programs. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1799, 1803-05 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
22. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Introduction: The Promise of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 371, 371 (1996) (describing how Congress intended to
address "the problem of violence against women through a variety of... mechanisms");
Michelle W. Easterling, Comment, For Better or Worse: The Federalization of Domestic
Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 938-40 (1996) (summarizing testimony presented to
Congress concerning nationwide statistics on domestic violence); see also Martha F. Davis
& Susan J. Kraham, Editorial, Beaten, Then Robbed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1995, at A31
(referring to studies finding that 50% to 90% of abused women were unable to escape
19971
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Act attempts to provide relief for survivors of gender-based violence not
only through legal channels,23 but also through enhanced funding for
24women's shelters, rape education and prevention programs,25 and many
other non-traditional remedies. 6 Faced with statistics demonstrating a
their batterers due to financial restraints); Ann Devroy, Analysts Dispute Clinton On
Crime Against Women, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1995, at A8 (commenting on statistical evi-
dence reflecting the number of domestic violence victims); Kris Henry, Clinton Announces
$26 Million For Women's Programs, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Mar. 22, 1995, at A6
(discussing how violent acts against women are growing almost three times faster than the
overall national crime rate); National Task Force on Violence Against Women (NOW Le-
gal Defense & Educ. Fund, Washington, D.C.), July 24, 1996, at 5 (noting that "violence is
the leading cause of injury to women aged 15-44"); The "Safety Net" Saves Lives: Sup-
porting Women and Families in the Face of Violence (NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Washington, D.C.), July 1996, at 1 (citing studies in which 25% to 30% of battered women
responding lost jobs due in part to domestic violence); The "Safety Net" Saves Lives: Sup-
porting Women and Families in the Face of Violence (NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1995, at 1 (stressing that 50% of abused women miss at least
three days of work per month because of complications from abuse). But cf. Wendy
McElroy, The Unfair Sex?, NAT'L REV., May 1, 1995, at 74 (discussing statistics showing
the amount of domestic violence committed by women against men); Frank S. Zepezauer,
Symposium, Does the Violence Against Women Act Discriminate Against Men?, INSIGHT
MAG., May 27, 1996, at 24, available in 1996 WL 8311171 (calling government programs
aimed at protecting women's rights part of a "feminist bureaucracy").
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (1994) (criminalizing stalking and harassing of one's
spouse when the perpetrator crosses state lines); 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994) (providing a
civil rights remedy for survivors of gender-based violence); 42 U.S.C. §§ 13992, 14001
(1994) (allocating funds for training for federal and state judges on the subject of gender-
based violence). Another key provision of the Act is the full faith and credit clause, which
provides for the interstate enforcement of protection orders. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
Prior to VAWA, states were not bound to recognize protection orders issued in other
states. See Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection
Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 255 (1995).
Without giving full faith and credit to orders issued in other states, victims were protected
only as long as they remained within the issuing state's borders. See id. VAWA mandates
that a protection order issued in one state must be accorded full faith and credit in a tribu-
nal in any other state. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a); see also Klein, supra, at 255 (discussing the
ramifications of the full faith and credit provision of VAWA in comparison to past proce-
dures for enforcing out-of-state protection orders).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 10402(a) (1994) (providing housing assistance for survivors of
domestic violence).
25. See id. at § 10418(a) (providing block grants for organizations to sponsor domes-
tic violence awareness programs).
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1994) (providing relief for battered immigrant women); 42
U.S.C. § 10416(a) (1994) (providing funding for a national domestic abuse hotline). The
House of Representatives voiced specific concerns about the rights of non-citizen victims
of domestic abuse. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993). The House Report com-
mented that under law existing at the time of VAWA, the rights of a non-citizen spouse
were under the control of the citizen-spouse. See id. For example, the House Report dis-
cussed how a resident may, but is not required to, request a visa petition for the alien
spouse. See id. The citizen can revoke the petition at any time, denying the alien spouse
the opportunity to obtain citizenship and rights. See id. Thus, a battered alien spouse may
[Vol. 47:189
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27national escalation of violence against women, coupled with evidenceconnecting such violence to interstate commerce,28 a bipartisan Con-
fail to report instances of abuse for fear of retaliation or deportation. See id.
27. See supra note 22 (giving statistics of the alarming rise of domestic abuse and
overall violence against women in the United States). After four years of testimony, Con-
gress found that:
In 1991, at least 21,000 domestic crimes were reported to the police every week;
at least 1.1 million reported assaults ... were committed against women in their
homes that year; unreported domestic crimes have been estimated to be more
than three times this total.
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
Violence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more com-
mon than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined. As
many as 4 million women a year are the victims of domestic violence. Three out
of four women will be the victim of a violent crime sometime during their life.
Id. at 38 (citations omitted). "Every week, during 1991, more than 2,000 women were
raped, and more than 90 women were murdered-9 out of 10 by men." Id.
An estimated 4 million American women are battered each year by their hus-
bands or partners. Approximately 95% of all domestic violence victims are
women. About 35% of women visiting hospital emergency rooms are there due
to injuries sustained as a result of domestic violence. One study of battered
women found that 63 percent of the victims had been beaten while they were
pregnant.
H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26; see also Mary C. Carty, Comment, Doe v. Doe and the Vio-
lence Against Women Act: A Post-Lopez Commerce Clause Analysis, 71 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 465, 466-69 (1997) (describing a reluctance by "modern American society" to recog-
nize domestic violence as a national problem); W.H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against
Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 582-83 (1993) (pro-
viding statistics demonstrating more violence against women than men, and categorizing
this violence as "hate crime victimization").
28. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54. In finding a connection between violence against
women and interstate commerce, the Senate committee found:
[S]tudies report that almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are
forced to quit in the aftermath of the crime. Even the fear of gender-based vio-
lence affects the economy because it deters women from taking jobs in certain
areas or at certain hours that pose a significant risk of such violence.
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gress29 passed VAWA to combat the harsh results of this violence.3° One
of the most innovative and controversial aspects of VAWA is the civil
rights provision," which provides a civil remedy for survivors of gender-
based violence. The provision declares that violence motivated by gen-
der violates a victim's federal civil rights.3 Congress enacted the civil
rights provision to provide a nationally uniform remedy for victims of
29. See Patricia Schroeder, Stopping Violence Against Women Still Takes a Fight: If in
Doubt, Just Look at the 104th Congress, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 377, 377-78 (1996) (noting that the
House of Representatives unanimously passed VAWA as a part of the Omnibus Crime
Bill of 1994). The Honorable Patricia M. Schroeder, a Democrat from Colorado, was a
member of the House of Representatives during the 104th Congress and an avid propo-
nent of VAWA. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) originally introduced the Act to Con-
gress in 1990. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37. The bill died in committee during the 102nd
Congress, was reintroduced by Biden and Representative Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.) in 1993,
was passed by both houses of Congress, and was signed into law on September 13, 1994.
Cf. Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1539, 1539 (Sept. 13, 1994). In addition to the efforts of Senator Biden and
Representative Boxer, VAWA gained support from Representatives Schroeder and Newt
Gingrich (R-Ga.), and Senators Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Ed-
ward Kennedy (D-Mass.), and Olympia Snowe (R-Me.).
30. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat.
1796, 1902-55 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
Congress's primary goal in enacting VAWA was to increase awareness about domestic
violence and violence against women and to recognize publicly such violence as a national
problem. See Wendy Rae Willis, Note, The Gun is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and
Title III of The Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 2197, 2202 (1992). Congress
intended VAWA to respond to "the underlying attitude that [domestic] violence is some-
how less serious than other crime." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38. Secondly, the Act at-
tempts to provide relief for victims of gender-motivated violence in the same way as vic-
tims of race-motivated violence. See Willis, supra, at 2202. Finally, VAWA provides relief
for victims of gender-based discrimination to supplement often inadequate state remedies.
See id.; Julie Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 505, 505-06 (1995) (discussing the inade-
quacy of state and federal laws prior to VAWA in protecting people from gender-
motivated violence).
31. See Goldscheid & Kraham, supra note 30, at 505 (calling the civil rights provision
"historic"); Schneider, supra note 22, at 371 (identifying the civil rights remedy as "innova-
tive"); Carolyn Peri Weiss, Recent Development, Title III of the Violence Against Women
Act: Constitutionally Safe and Sound, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 733 (1997) (describing the
civil rights provision of the Act as "the most controversial").
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). The civil rights provision of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 reads in part:
[I]t is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender moti-
vated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting inter-
state commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender.
Id. The Act defines a "crime of violence motivated by gender" as "a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an
animus based on the victim's gender." Id. § 13981(d)(1).
33. See id. § 13981(a).
[Vol. 47:189
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crimes specifically motivated by gender14 and to limit the effect of gen-
der-motivated violence on interstate commerce.35 Congress adopted the
Act pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause36 and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Entertaining claims that the civil rights provision of VAWA exceeded
Congress's commerce power, two District Court judges reached opposite
conclusions on the issue.38 In Doe v. Doe,39 the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut held that because gender-motivated
violence substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress acted within
its constitutional power to enact the civil rights provision of VAWA.
40
One month after the decision in Doe, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia, in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic &
State University,41 held that gender-motivated crimes do not substantially
34. See Goldscheid & Kraham, supra note 30, at 506. Goldscheid and Kraham noted
that Congress recognized that:
[M]illions of women and girls who each year become victims of rape, domestic
violence and many other crimes are not selected at random, nor are they singled
out because of their individual circumstances; rather, they are exposed to terror,
brutality, serious injury and even death because of their sex.
Id. at 505 (quoting Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1990) (statement of Helen Neuborne)). Goldscheid and
Kraham also emphasize that the civil rights remedy of VAWA provides an opportunity for
redress for victims of gender-motivated violence, where adequate remedies previously did
not exist. See id. at 506.
35. See supra note 28 (citing legislative history describing the economic effects of
gender-motivated violence).
36. See supra note 2 (discussing Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause).
Congress has regulated criminal activity through its commerce power in many instances,
including: the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789; the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; and the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993). Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The
constitutionality of VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment is beyond the scope of this
Note.
38. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801 (W.D.
Va. 1996) (holding that VAWA was an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power),
rev'd, No. 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,
617 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding the civil rights provision of VAWA as a proper exercise of
Congress's commerce power); see also Courts Split in Rulings on VA WA's Constitutional-
ity (NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), 1996, at 1-2 (discussing the ar-
guments and rulings made in Brzonkala and Doe).
39. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
40. See id. at 613, 617.
41. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir.
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affect interstate commerce and, therefore, the civil rights remedy of
VAWA was unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Brzonkala, and
in agreement with Doe, found that Congress legislated within its constitu-
tionally authorized power in its enactment of the civil rights provision of
VAWA.43
This Note first traces Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence
on congressional regulation of activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce. This Note then discusses the first cases to address the
validity of VAWA's civil rights provision under the Commerce Clause.
This Note clarifies the criteria the Supreme Court has used to determine
the constitutionality of legislative action under the Commerce Clause,
and demonstrates how the 1994 Violence Against Women Act is suffi-
ciently tied to interstate commerce under those criteria. This Note con-
cludes by suggesting that the Supreme Court likely would uphold the
constitutionality of the civil rights provision of VAWA.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: DEFINING INTERSTATE
COMMERCE FROM GIBBONS TO LOPEZ
A. Laying the Groundwork for Judicial Interpretation
When drafting the United States Constitution, the founding fathers
envisioned a national government possessing distinct powers separate
from those of the states.a" Accordingly, the founding fathers' plan for a
new nation allocated power between the individual states and the federal
government. 5 Among the enumerated powers granted to Congress in
Dec. 23, 1997).
42. See id. at 792-93, 801.
43. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., No. 96-2316, 1997 WL
785529, at *26 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997).
44. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (discussing the fundamental
constitutional principle of dual sovereignty); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 242 (1985) (recognizing the balancing of federal and state powers as a protection of
the peoples' "fundamental liberties"); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madi-
son) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the limited and defined powers of the federal
government under the Constitution); TRIBE, supra note 4, § 5-20, at 302-03 (discussing the
dual sovereignty of federal and state governments under the Constitution and the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of this constitutional doctrine); Corwin, supra note 5, at 482
(acknowledging that the existence of separate state powers, by definition, limits national
power); Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1934) (discussing the universal acceptance of the concept of
separation of federal and state powers at the Constitutional Convention).
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; supra note 16 (for the text of the Tenth Amendment);
see also John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, AM. POL. SC.
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the Constitution was the power to regulate commerce among the several
46states. The scope of the commerce power, however, remained untested
and uncertain until the landmark decision of Chief Justice John Marshall
in Gibbons v. Ogden.47
In Gibbons, the Court questioned whether New York State could
grant one of its citizens the exclusive right to navigate steamboats be-
tween New York and New Jersey in the face of a federal law licensing
REV. (Dec. 1961), reprinted in PETER WOLL, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: READING AND
CASES 11-28 (9th ed. 1987) (addressing the different positions toward federalism debated
at the Constitutional Convention); Stern, supra note 44, at 1338 (noting that despite criti-
cism of the broad standard proposed for division of power between individual states and
the federal government, the Constitutional Convention approved the proposal). The con-
cept of "dual federalism" encompasses the idea that both the federal and state govern-
ments could act to complement the other's regulatory duties. See Cirillo & Eisenhofer,
supra note 2, at 910 (questioning "whether state power could be exercised in the absence
of congressional activity"). See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federal-
ism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950) (discussing the concept of dual federalism).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; supra note 2 (for the text of the Commerce
Clause). The founding fathers had overlooked commerce when establishing a government
under the Articles of Confederation because up until that time, the colonies had suffered
"no significant commercial problems." See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 4.3, at
368. At the time of the Articles of Confederation, states elected to have the individual
power to regulate commerce because they feared discrimination by other states with con-
flicting commercial interests. See id. The Articles of Confederation provided that "[tihe
[U]nited [S]tates in [C]ongress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and
power of ... regulating the trade and manageing [sic] all affairs with the Indians, not
members of any of the states." U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX. Rather
than promote commerce, the absence of centralized control hindered trade relations be-
tween the states and foreign nations. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 4.3, at
368-69; see also ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1935), reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 54-
55 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1987) (noting that the status of commerce between the
states under the Articles of Confederation demonstrated the need for a competent, cen-
tralized government); JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144 (2d ed. 1983)
(asserting that the lack of a centralized federal commerce power led to "economic chaos");
2 STORY, supra note 3, § 1062, at 512 (noting that without the power to regulate among
the states, the power to regulate foreign commerce would be "incomplete and ineffec-
tual"). Instead of promoting unity, the lack of a national authority to regulate commerce
caused states to be self-serving and narrow-minded. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 5, § 4.3, at 368-69 (discussing commercial relations between the states under the Arti-
cles of Confederation). When planning began for the 1787 Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia, commerce topped the list of areas needing federal guidance. See id. § 4.3, at
369 (noting that the founding fathers recognized the need for revision of the Articles of
Confederation to address multistate problems). Indeed, Congress's grant of power to
regulate commerce among the states received little or no opposition at the Constitutional
Convention. See 2 STORY, supra note 3, § 1055, at 505.
47. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Until Gibbons, Congress made little substantive use
of its commerce power. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 645 (1946) (noting "little demand" by citi-
zens for governmental intrusion into commercial affairs).
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shipping on that same waterway."' The Gibbons Court broadly inter-
preted commerce to include the power to create the laws by which com-
merce should be governed.49 Chief Justice Marshall refused to limit the
definition of commerce to sales and trade, instead extending it to include
navigation, transportation, and anything falling under the definition of
"intercourse. '"5° The Court emphasized that Congress's power to regu-
late encompassed commerce affecting the several states but not com-
merce occurring within one state.51 For nearly a century after Gibbons,
Commerce Clause jurisprudence focused not on proactive uses of the
commerce power,52 but rather on limiting state legislation that discrimi-
53nated against interstate commerce.
B. Turning the Tide in Favor of Regulation
In the 1880s, following the adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act,54
attitudes surrounding the scope of the government's power began to
48. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 2-3.
49. See id. at 196 (prescribing that Congress's power to regulate commerce includes
creating the rules by which to regulate); see also 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5,
§ 4.1, at 371-72 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's broad reading of Congress's commerce
power).
50. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90. The Court found that the navigable
waters between New York and New Jersey were part of the "high seas" and thus con-
trolled by the nation, not the individual states. See id. at 22.
51. See id. at 194-95 (commenting that the federal power to regulate intrastate com-
merce would be "inconvenient" and "unnecessary"); see also Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 568, 573-74 (1852) (affirming the inapplicability of the Commerce Clause to activi-
ties of citizens occurring entirely within one state).
52. See Stern, supra note 47, at 645-47. During this century of economic growth, citi-
zens were content to live without the intrusion of government into the details of everyday
life. See id. at 645. As a result, Congress made little use of its authority to regulate com-
merce or any of its other powers under the Constitution. See id. But once the economy
and individual livelihoods began to suffer, after a rapid progression toward "unrestrained
freedom of enterprise," citizens turned toward Congress to integrate the national economy
and remedy the economic problems. See id.
53. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1888) (inquiring whether a state ban on
the manufacturing of liquor shipped out of state would interfere with Congress's authority
to regulate interstate commerce); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870)
(holding that Congress could regulate a steamship which transported goods for sale or
trade in other states as an "instrument" of commerce, even though the ship operated
solely within the waters of one state); Veazie, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 573-75 (holding that
state regulation of steamboats did not violate the Commerce Clause so long as the com-
merce remained within the state); see also TRIBE, supra note 4, § 5-4, at 306 (describing
Commerce Clause jurisprudence during this time as rarely involving the review of con-
gressional legislation).
54. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
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55 56
change." A series of congressional enactments forced the Court to de-
emphasize interpretations involving state action and to focus instead on
congressional exercises of power.57 When first confronted with cases
arising under the new legislation, the Court adhered to established prin-
ciples, holding that activities such as manufacturing and production did
not fall within the scope of the Commerce Clause. 8 As industry and
transportation developed nationwide, 9 the Court continued to address
federal and state legislative conflicts with increasing frequency, devel-
55. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513,
531 (1936) (recognizing state sovereignty as essential and independent from federal legis-
lation); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935) (invalidating
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 because the Act did not regulate commercial activity
that could be characterized as interstate); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 508-09 (1905) (sup-
porting the concept that general police powers remain with the individual states), over-
ruled in part by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); see also TRIBE, supra note 4,
§ 5-4, at 307-08 (noting that between 1887 and 1937 the Supreme Court restricted the
scope of commerce regulation falling outside certain formalistic classifications). But cf
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,1410
(1987) (outlining a gradual expansion of commerce power from 1887 until the New Deal
legislation, while admitting that certain economic activities remained outside Congress's
commerce power).
56. See, e.g., Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768; Anti-Lottery
Act of 1890, ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465; Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1884).
57. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121-25 (1942) (noting that Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, prior to the Court's decision in Wickard, primarily addressed state-
sanctioned activities).
58. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (invalidating a federal
regulation involving employee hours and wages by holding that the regulations constituted
production, not commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (re-
fusing to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to a sugar manufacturing monopoly because
manufacturing was tied insufficiently to interstate commerce); see also Cirillo & Eisen-
hofer, supra note 2, at 910 n.66 (commenting that distinguishing commerce from certain
activities, such as manufacturing and production, allowed Congress to regulate without
offending the police power of the states); Robert Wax, Comment, United States v. Lopez:
The Continued Ambiguity of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 275, 279
nn.36-37 (1996) (describing that it was not the intent of the manufacturer, but rather, the
actual realization of such intent that determined whether Congress could regulate a prod-
uct as affecting interstate commerce). Despite the increase in congressional enactments,
the Court continued to address conflicts existing between state legislation and the federal
commerce power. See Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 620 (1898) (holding valid
the existence of a livestock exchange due to its remote effect on interstate commerce);
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1898) (finding that interstate commerce
was unaffected despite one-half of a stockyard being in Kansas and the other half in Mis-
souri); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1888) (upholding an Iowa statute that prohib-
ited the manufacture of alcohol by distinguishing manufacturing from commerce).
59. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (12th ed. 1991) (discussing
the development of industry and the increase in economic concerns of citizens and Con-
gress).
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oping a gradual willingness to expand the scope of the commerce
power.6' The Court specifically addressed congressional legislation in
two distinct areas: economic regulation and police power regulation."
1. Economic Regulation
The Court addressed the constitutionality of legislation concerning
economic regulation in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.62 In E.C. Knight,
the federal government claimed that several major sugar refineries vio-
lated the Sherman Antitrust Act." The government argued that Con-
gress could regulate the type of monopolies that existed in the sugar re-
fining industry because refined sugar products, such as molasses and
syrup, eventually entered into the stream of interstate commerce.64 The
Court disagreed, holding that because no direct link existed between
manufacturing and commerce, Congress could not regulate the monopo-
lies through its commerce power. 6' The mere manufacture of a product
intended for use in interstate markets did not subject the manufacturing
66to regulation under the Commerce Clause. The Court refused to accept
the notion that indirect effects on interstate trade or commerce justified
federal regulation.67
60. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 618-19 (1911) (ex-
tending Congress's power to regulate the transportation of goods intended for both intra-
state and interstate commerce); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S.
281, 287 (1908) (holding that promulgating railroad regulations under the commerce
power was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Johnson v. Southern
Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 22 (1904) (holding that an instrument which has stopped temporarily,
but is regularly used in interstate commerce is still in interstate commerce). But see Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,179 (1908) (finding no connection between interstate com-
merce and membership in a labor organization).
61. See I ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 4.5, at 378-79 (discussing the devel-
opment of both economic and general police power regulation under the Commerce
Clause).
62. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
63. See id. at 2-3.
64. See id. at 13. The government argued that the enjoyment of sugar products was
such a "necessary of life" for the majority of the population that the interstate sale and
trade of such goods was "indispensable." Id. at 12.
65. See id. at 17.
66. See id. at 12. The Court listed certain activities that might indirectly affect inter-
state commerce such as contracts or conspiracies to control agriculture, mining, produc-
tion, or the raising or lowering of wages. See id. at 16. The Court remained unwilling to
extend Congress's regulatory power, without proof indicating it should do otherwise, be-
cause the sugar refineries did not intend to restrain interstate trade. See id. at 17.
67. See id. In holding as it did, the Court afforded great deference to state power by
distinguishing between the original powers of the states and those allocated to Congress
through the Constitution. See id. at 11. The Court mentioned that the relief to state citi-
zens from damage by a monopoly should be granted by the individual state and not the
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Not long after the decision in E.C. Knight, the Court modified its ap-
proach to congressional legislation concerning commerce. In Houston,
East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States (the Shreveport Rate
Case),6' the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order
regulating shipping rates for train hauls completely within Texas state
lines.69 Because the rates for shipping between Shreveport, Louisiana
and destinations in Texas were unreasonably higher than the rates for
shipments solely within Texas, the ICC established maximum rates for
shipping between these destinations. ° The ICC claimed that because
shippers competed for transportation along the same routes, state rail-
road authorities should be prohibited from intentionally setting rates
higher for shipping between Shreveport and Texas than the rates estab-
lished for shipping the same distance within Texas.' The Court upheld
the ICC regulation and ordered that Texas railroads cease the discrimi-
natory practice of setting rates on interstate shipments higher than those
72on intrastate shipments. The Court found that although the ICC order
specifically regulated intrastate activity, the activity's "substantial rela-
tion" to interstate commerce triggered Congress's regulatory authority.73
Thus, the Court in the Shreveport Rate Case, unlike in E.C. Knight, found
an intrastate activity within congressional control because the ultimate
74result of the activity affected interstate commerce.
federal government. See id. The Court concluded that if congressional regulatory power
extended to all activities "whose ultimate result may affect external commerce," very few
activities would remain under state control. Id. at 16; see supra note 45 (discussing the
concept of dual federalism).
68. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
69. See id. at 345.
70. See id. at 346.
71. See id. at 346-47. The ICC argued that charging higher rates for shipments be-
tween Shreveport and Texas discriminated against shipments to Louisiana in favor of
shipments within Texas. See id. at 345.
72. See id. at 360. The Court first addressed the issue of interstate railroad fares in
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). With facts similar to
those in the Shreveport Rate Case, the Wabash Court prohibited state governments from
regulating railroad fares on trains that originated in one state and ended in another. See
Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577. Congress specifically passed the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887 to end this type of pricing discrimination. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch.
104, 24 Stat. 379, 379; Epstein, supra note 55, at 1413-14 (discussing the public and legisla-
tive concerns surrounding the promulgation of the Interstate Commerce Act).
73. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351 (affirming Congress's power to in-
sure the safety and efficiency of interstate commerce through regulation).
74. See id. The Court further held that regulation was necessary under the Com-
merce Clause in order for Congress to implement other interstate regulations effectively.
See id.; see also Wax, supra note 58, at 280 (discussing the Court's decision to permit the
ICC to regulate railroad rates in order to maintain fair competition between interstate and
intrastate railroads).
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Despite its decision in the Shreveport Rate Case, the Court refused to
limit itself to applying only the newly created "substantial relation" or
"substantially affect" test when addressing commerce issues.7 1 Instead,
Justice Holmes chose to create yet another method to determine the ap-
plicability of the commerce power in Swift & Co. v. United States.76 In
Swift, the Court upheld the regulation of price fixing within a stockyard
even though the stockyard conducted activities solely within one state.77
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes found the congressional regulation
constitutional because it fell within the "current of commerce., 78 As de-
fined by the Court, this new test encompassed those activities that began
in one state and were expected to conclude in another.79 Thus, the actual
interstate transaction itself became a part of commerce and fell under the
commerce power.
2. Police Power Regulation
Although the commerce power clearly applied to those activities eco-
nomic in nature, the relationship between commerce and non-economic
activities remained tenuous.8 The Court struggled to establish guidelines
for determining the minimum level of connection required between an
82activity and interstate commerce to invoke the commerce power. In or-
75. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905) (establishing a "current
of commerce" theory).
76. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
77. See id. at 396-97, 399.
78. Id. at 399.
79. See id. at 398-99. The Court explained that when cattle are raised and reared in
one state for eventual sale in another state, a common industry practice, the overall cur-
rent of commerce is affected. See id. The Court found that the effects of monopolies on
interstate commerce were not "accidental, secondary, remote or merely probable." Id. at
397.
80. See id. at 398-99.
81. See Hammer v. Dagenhart (the Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918)
(refusing to extend Congress's commerce power to the regulation of goods manufactured
by children), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
82. See Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 82 (1925) (up-
holding the existence of a builders' exchange under the Sherman Antitrust Act). As in
E.C. Knight, the Court looked to the intent of those who established the builders exchange
when determining how the exchange affected interstate commerce. See id. The Court up-
held the existence of the exchange because the builders did not intend for the exchange to
affect interstate commerce. See id. In later years, intent became irrelevant in the Court's
decisions concerning the regulation of interstate commerce. See United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (deemphasizing the consideration of congressional motive or in-
tent as part of Commerce Clause decisions); The Child Labor Case, 247 U.S. at 277-78
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the intent of the legislature is irrelevant when regu-
lating child labor as long as the labor affected interstate commerce).
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der to address public welfare concerns that Congress could not directly
regulate, the Court began to allow Congress to use its police power to
prohibit the transportation of certain goods in order to protect public
welfare. The Court used this technique to uphold Congress's exercise of
such moral regulation in Champion v. Ames (the Lottery Case).83 In the
Lottery Case, the Court upheld the federal Anti-Lottery Act 4 which pro-
hibited the interstate shipment of lottery tickets, specifically in Texas and
California. 5 Although the Act did not regulate the sale or transportation
of tickets within a state, the Court recognized Congress's clear intention
to discourage gambling by passing the Act. 6 The Lottery Case estab-
lished Congress's ability to regulate interstate activities harmful to the
public good by prohibiting the transportation of harmful items.87 After
the Lottery Case, the Court upheld other "police power" regulations in
the areas of pure food and drugs, obscenity, white slave traffic, and dis-
eased plants or animals.8'
83. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
84. Ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465 (1890).
85. See The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 363-64.
86. See id. at 356. Earlier in Phalen v. Virginia, the Court commented on an apparent
distaste for gambling and betting, finding that lotteries brought decay and unproductivity
to entire communities and "prey[ed] upon the hard earnings of the poor." 49 U.S. (8
How.) 163, 168 (1850).
87. See The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 363.
88. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913) (upholding the Mann
Act, which prohibited the interstate movement of prostitutes); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U.S. 45, 58, 60 (1911) (authorizing the seizure of impure eggs transported inter-
state under the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906); United States v. Popper, 98 F. 423, 424
(N.D. Cal. 1899) (regulating the interstate shipment of birth control devices). The Court's
concern over issues of public morals included employee-employer relationships. See gen-
erally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (discussing the regulation of worker
hours and wages in coal mines); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935) (addressing the establishment of fair labor wages and hours nationwide);
Hammer v. Dagenhart (the Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (dealing with the fed-
eral regulation of child labor), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
In the Child Labor Case, the Court struck down a federal statute prohibiting the inter-
state shipment of goods manufactured by children under sixteen-years old and under cer-
tain working conditions. See 247 U.S. at 269, 277. The Court reasoned that because the
manufactured goods themselves were harmless and it was actually the employment of un-
derage children that was unlawful, interstate commerce was not affected. See id. at 271-72.
In a striking dissent, however, Justice Holmes argued that as long as Congress could con-
stitutionally regulate the interstate shipment of the goods, the intent of the legislature did
not matter. See id. at 277-78 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes's dissent in the
Child Labor Case later was adopted unanimously as the majority opinion by the Court in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See infra notes 104-14 and accompanying text
(discussing the Darby opinion); see also Robert Eugene Cushman, The National Police
Power Under The Commerce Clause Of The Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 289, 381-412
(1919) (discussing congressional regulations and police power); Thomas Reed Powell, The
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C. The New Deal: Laying a Foundation for Modern
Commerce Clause Analysis
By the time of the New Deal in 1933, analysis of Commerce Clause
cases continued to vacillate between varying standards of review and
methods of analysis. 89 Determined to establish one recognized standard
of review and provide for stability in commerce power analysis, the Su-
preme Court once again set out to distinguish between direct and indi-
rect effects on commerce. 90 In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,91 the government charged Schechter Poultry Corp. with violating
minimum wage and hour provisions established by the State of New
York.92 Although the Schechter corporation operated solely within New
York, the government argued that the company's actions "affected" in-
terstate commerce.93 In an attempt to resolve any confusion between the
two tests, the Schechter Court held that if an intrastate activity directly
affected interstate commerce, Congress could regulate the activity; but if
the activity only indirectly affected interstate commerce, Congress could
not regulate the activity under the Commerce Clause. 94 While making
this seemingly simple distinction, the Court characterized the level of ef-
fect of intrastate activity on interstate commerce as "a fundamental one,
essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system." 95
Child Labor Law, The Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3 S. L.Q. 175, 202
(1918) (arguing that the Court's reasoning in the Child Labor Case was flawed).
89. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (the Shreveport Rate Case),
234 U.S. 342, 358-60 (1914) (discussing the "substantially affects" test). But see Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396-99 (1905) (discussing the "current of commerce"
theory).
90. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546. Although the Schechter opinion was one of the
first to stress the distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce, other deci-
sions employed a similar line of analysis. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U.S.
612, 619 (1911) (finding a "direct relation" between employee work hours and general
health and human welfare); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908) (requiring
Congress to find a "substantial relation" to the commerce it intended to regulate without
using the terms "direct" and "indirect"), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); see also D.J. Farage, That Which "Directly" Affects Interstate
Commerce, 42 DICK. L. REv. 1, 10 (1937) (describing how a cause and effect analysis often
is triggered when analyzing "directness").
91. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
92. See id. at 519.
93. See id. at 546.
94. See id. at 547 (discussing whether the intent behind the intrastate activity was di-
rected toward affecting interstate commerce); see also Farage, supra note 90, at 3 (dis-
cussing the difference between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce). Farage
interpreted Schechter to define "direct" as those statutes which clearly discriminate against
commerce. See Farage, supra note 90, at 3. According to Farage, "indirect" included
those statutes which are non-discriminatory toward commerce. See id.
95. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548.
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Two years later, however, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,96
the Court departed from the distinction between direct and indirect ef-
fects established in Schechter9 by creating a new test for determining
whether an activity could be regulated under the commerce power.98 If a
regulated activity substantially affected commerce among the states, the
regulation would be upheld under the federal commerce power, regard-
less of the intent of the regulation." Thus, the same Court that decided
Schechter upheld this exercise of the commerce power and ordered Jones
& Laughlin Steel to rehire employees discharged in violation of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) 01 Departing from its ear-
lier decisions that had excluded manufacturing and production from
commerce,' 2 the Court recognized that manufacturing played a vital role
in the company's operations and that any significant effect on manufac-
turing might prove "catastrophic" to interstate commerce.""
96. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
97. See id. at 31 (dismissing the Schechter test while allowing for federal regulation of
actions having a direct burden on interstate activity).
98. See id. at 37.
99. See id. at 30-32, 37-38. Jones & Laughlin operated its business activities in several
different states. See id. at 26. For example, mining occurred in one state, manufacturing
in another, and shipping throughout the Great Lakes region. See id. Thus, while the
regulation might have been intended to affect only activities in one state, the activity
within that state necessarily affected operations in the other states because of the structure
of the corporation. See id. at 37-38.
100. See id. at 48-49 (requiring the reinstatement of fired employees as a remedy for
violation of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
101. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
102. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (holding that manufac-
turing and production do not affect commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1, 12 (1895) (same); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1888) (same).
103. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41. Abandoning Justice Holmes's "current of
commerce" theory, the Court refused to make distinctions as to where in the manufactur-
ing or shipping process regulation occurred. See id. at 36. As long as a regulated activity
substantially affected interstate commerce, the regulation was constitutional. See id. at 36-
37, 49. Decided at the same time as Jones & Laughlin, NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co. held that regulations established under the NLRA applied to a men's cloth-
ing manufacturer who produced only one-half of one percent of all men's clothing manu-
factured nationwide. See 301 U.S. 58, 72-75 (1937). The Court agreed with the findings of
the National Labor Relations Board, reasoning that the raw materials to make the cloth-
ing and the finished products shipped out of state substantially contributed to interstate
commerce. See id. at 73, 75; see also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 225-
27 (1963) (applying the NLRA to a New York oil distributor on the basis that any prob-
lems during the course of shipping the oil from other states into New York would tend to
affect interstate commerce); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-09 (1939) (holding that
regulations under the NLRA applied to a New Jersey clothing shop, regardless of the
amount of goods the shop contributed to interstate commerce). Therefore, the distinction
became irrelevant as to whether the regulation affected the manufacturing plant, the
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The watershed decision in Jones & Laughlin paved the way for further
expansion of the Commerce Clause.' °4 In United States v. Darby,'5 the
Court entertained a challenge to the constitutionality of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938'0 as applied to the regulation of lumber. °7 The
Act prohibited the placement into interstate commerce of any goods
manufactured or produced in violation of certain national wage and hour
standards. The Court upheld Congress's use of the commerce power to
enact this legislation.' 9 In so holding, the Darby Court declined to con-
sider congressional motive or intent in passing the legislation. " Instead,
the Court looked only to whether the regulation of commerce was within
the plenary powers of Congress as conferred by the Constitution. ' Fur-
thermore, the Darby Court upheld part of the Act that criminalized any
violation of the wage and hour regulations. "2 In so doing, Darby estab-
lished that any regulation enacted by Congress must provide a reason-
able means to achieve a legitimate end in order to satisfy the Commerce
Clause.' 3 The Court stated that once Congress could constitutionally
regulate, it could adopt any reasonable means by which to do So.114
channels of transportation, or the final destination of the products for sale. Cf. Friedman-
Harry Marks, 301 U.S. at 72-75 (focusing on the fact that the regulated activity substan-
tially affected interstate commerce and not whether the activity was of one particular
type); Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37 (same).
104. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (rejecting the argument that
activities with a trivial effect on interstate commerce should be excluded from regulation
under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942) (extending the commerce power to include intrastate activities that substantially
interfere with or obstruct congressional exercise of the commerce power); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding the regulation of employee hours and wages
because the manufactured products flowed into the stream of interstate commerce); Vir-
ginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) (focusing on the po-
tential magnitude of the disruption of commerce from labor-management conflicts, rather
than on the manner of the regulation).
105. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
106. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
107. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 108.
108. See id. at 109. The Act established minimum wages and maximum work hours for
employees engaged in the manufacture of goods intended for interstate commerce. See id.
109. See id. at 115.
110. See id.
111. See id. The Court held that the motive and purpose of legislation were, "legisla-
tive judgment[s] upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
which the courts are given no control." Id. The Darby Court did note, however, that the
purpose of the Act was to prevent the production of goods under circumstances detrimen-
tal to employee health. See id. at 109.
112. See id. at 123.
113. See id. at 121.
114. See id. Once Congress could legitimately enact legislation, the Court stated that
Congress, "may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted
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Shortly after the decision in Darby, the Court held in Wickard v. Fil-
burn"5 that Congress could regulate not only those activities which by
themselves substantially affected interstate commerce, but also those ac-
tivities which, as a class, could produce that same effect."6 The Wickard
Court addressed the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938,17 which permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the
volume of wheat harvested by individual farmers."' Mr. Filburn, an Ohio
wheat farmer, challenged the Act, claiming that raising and consuming
wheat on his own farm constituted a local activity, not interstate com-
merce." 9 Although Mr. Filburn's farming activities produced wheat for
personal consumption, the Court upheld the Act and its power to set
farming quotas.2 The Wickard Court noted that the wheat grown by
Mr. Filburn, coupled with similar behavior by other farmers, would cre-
ate a cumulative effect on interstate commerce, and was therefore ap-
propriate for Congress to regulate under its commerce power.' 2' The
Court again rejected the distinction between direct and indirect effects,
expanding the commerce power by holding that if an activity had a sub-
stantial economic effect on interstate commerce, Congress could regulate
the activity under the Commerce Clause, regardless of whether the effect
was the result of the cumulative activities of several economic actors.1
22
This trio of cases introduced a new era of Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. '3 While earlier cases limited the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, these cases expanded the commerce 
power.12 4
end," even if the means adapted involved the regulation of some aspect of intrastate
commerce. Id.
115. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
116. See id. at 128-29.
117. Ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1994)).
118. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
119. See id. at 118-19.
120. See id. at 128-29.
121. See id The Court found that if a person could grow freely as much wheat as de-
sired for personal consumption, the demand on the overall market for wheat would lessen.
See id. at 127-28. Thus, while the effect on interstate commerce of one farmer's home con-
sumption of wheat may appear insignificant, home consumption by several farmers may
decrease the demand for wheat, affecting interstate commerce. See id. The Court stated,
"even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 125.
122. See id. at 128-29; see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (acknowl-
edging that the cumulative effect of wage increases in Ohio would affect interstate com-
merce).
123. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (noting that these three cases
greatly expanded Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
124. See id.; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (permitting Congress to use the Commerce
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Through the end of the 1940s, the Court continued to uphold broad ex-
ercises of Congress's commerce power and lay the foundation for mod-
ern Commerce Clause analysis."'25
D. Extending the Commerce Clause to Control Social Conduct
As a result of American sentiment focusing on civil rights in the 1960s,
Congress began to use the commerce power to regulate other activities,
such as racial discrimination, because of their effect on interstate com-126
merce. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,'27 a motel owner
denied accommodations to black patrons in violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.18 The owner claimed that the decision not to rent rooms to
black customers had no effect on interstate commerce," 9 and that Con-
gress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by passing the Act."1 The
Court held otherwise, reasoning that under the specific circumstances of
the case, including the fact that the location of the motel was less than a
Clause to regulate the production of wheat for home consumption); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (allowing regulation of hours and wages through the
commerce power because of a perceived effect on interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (upholding federal regulation of labor-
management relations because of its potential effect on interstate commerce).
125. See United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 461-62
(1949) (upholding congressional regulation of the women's clothing industry in Massachu-
setts under the Sherman Act, despite the fact that 80% of the cloth used in the manufac-
turing process was from other states); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533,
569 (1939) (noting that interstate commerce often relies on the stability of intrastate com-
mercial activities).
126. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296, 304 (1964) (finding the commerce
power applicable to the discriminatory practices of a restaurant serving food which had
moved through the channels of interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53, 258 (1964) (finding the commerce power applicable to
the discriminatory practices of a hotel whose guests moved in interstate commerce);
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1960) (finding that a bus station restaurant
placed a burden on interstate commerce by maintaining segregated restaurant facilities).
Congress shifted its focus in the area of civil rights to commerce during the 1950s and
1960s in an effort to ensure the civil rights of all Americans. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS
G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA 469 (1992). Although
seminal cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), paved the way
for equal treatment of citizens when the government involved itself in an activity or regu-
lation, discrimination continued to thrive in the private sector during this time. See
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra, at 469. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under
the federal commerce power in an attempt to eliminate discrimination in the private sec-
tor. See id.
127. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
128. See id. at 243.
129. See id. at 243-44.
130. See id.
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mile from an interstate highway, the owner's policy affected interstate
131
commerce.
The Court in Katzenbach v. McClung,'32 decided the same day as Heart
of Atlanta, considered another challenge to a different aspect of anti-racediscrminaion .... 131
discrimination legislation. In Katzenbach, a black man was denied
service at Ollie's Barbeque, a restaurant located eleven blocks from an
interstate highway in Alabama. The Court upheld Congress's power to
regulate the restaurant's activities because a substantial portion of the
food served at the restaurant arrived through the channels of interstate
commerce and because of the restaurant's proximity to the highway.'35
The Court found that while activities at the restaurant may have had only
an incidental effect on interstate commerce, interstate commerce could
be cumulatively affected by such practices.'
Jointly, Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach founded modern Commerce
Clause analysis.117 Heart of Atlanta established that Congress may regu-
late activities affecting interstate commerce if a rational basis existed to
connect the activity to interstate commerce. Further, the Court in
Katzenbach held that where Congress had a rational basis for enacting a
regulatory scheme, the Court's only role was to ensure the proper appli-
cation of the regulations.' Using this analysis, the Katzenbach Court
held that racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse ef-
fect on interstate commerce."' Following these decisions, the Court con-
131. See id. at 258. The Court held that by denying accommodations to blacks, the ho-
tel's actions restricted their movement and freedom of travel. See id. at 252-53. There-
fore, discouraging the interstate transportation of certain individuals clearly affected inter-
state commerce. See id.
132. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
133. See id. at 296.
134. See id. at 296-97.
135. See id. at 296, 304. Almost half of the food served at Ollie's was purchased from a
supplier who received his goods through out-of-state commerce. See id. at 296-97.
136. See id. at 304-05.
137. Cf. 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, § 4.10, at 412-13 (discussing the Court's
validation in these cases of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Prior to 1964, the Court had
prohibited racial discrimination in the channels of interstate commerce. See Henderson v.
United States, 339 U.S. 816, 824-26 (1950) (invalidating a railroad regulation limiting din-
ing car services available to blacks but not to whites as violative of the Interstate Com-
merce Act); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (invalidating a Virginia statute
authorizing segregation on buses traveling interstate); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S.
80, 94-95, 97 (1941) (finding a railroad regulation imposing segregation on train sleeping
cars violated the Interstate Commerce Act).
138. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258-59 (1964).
139. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304.
140. See id. The Court found that Congress, "in light of the facts and testimony before
them, ha[d] a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the pro-
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tinued to uphold congressional use of the commerce power to regulate
non-commercial activities."' Areas such as land use 14 and loan shark-
ing141 were found to be within the realm of protection of the Commerce
Clause if Congress had a rational basis for enacting the legislation.
E. Ushering in a New Era: United States v. Lopez
In United States v. Lopez,'44 the Supreme Court decided the most sig-
nificant Commerce Clause case in fifty years.' In Lopez, a high school
tection of commerce." Id. at 303-04.
141. The Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery proved to be the only
anomaly during this time. See 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5,
§ 4.10, at 423 (discussing that in cases following the National League of Cities decision, the
Court failed to hold that a federal law could not apply to state or local governments). In
National League of Cities, the Court held that congressional regulation under amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act exceeded Congress's commerce power. See 426 U.S. at
851-52. The original 1938 Act had been upheld under the commerce power in United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941). The National League of Cities decision sur-
prised many legal scholars because the Court had not invalidated a statute as an extension
of the commerce power since the 1930s. See Sotirios A. Barber, National League of Cities
v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment?, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 161, 161-64 (dis-
cussing the contentious nature of the National League of Cities decision); see also PHILIP
BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 191-94 (1982) (same);
Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Per-
spective, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 81-82 (same).
However, Garcia expressly overruled National League of Cities less than a decade later,
and returned Commerce Clause jurisprudence to its earlier status. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at
531. Garcia questioned whether the same wage and hour regulations at issue in National
League of Cities applied to mass-transit employees in a municipally owned and operated
system. See id. at 530. The Court permitted the regulation to extend to the municipality,
and noted that this extension would not impinge upon a state's rights because of the "in-
ternal safeguards" inherent in the federal system. Id. at 556.
142. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281
(1981) (holding that congressional findings supporting legislative action withstood the ra-
tional basis test).
143. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152-55 (1971) (upholding the congres-
sional regulation of intrastate loan sharking transactions by linking the transactions to in-
terstate organized crime).
144. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
145. See Arkin, supra note 18, at 1569; Wax, supra note 58, at 286 (noting that the Lo-
pez decision stopped the expansion of Congress's commerce power); Carlo D'Angelo,
Note, The Impact of United States v. Lopez Upon Selected Firearms Provisions of Title 18
U.S.C. § 922, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 571, 591 (1996) (commenting that Lopez marked the
first time in over fifty years that the Court held that a federal law exceeded Congress's
commerce power); Michael J. Trapp, Note, A Small Step Towards Restoring the Balance of
Federalism: A Limit to Federal Power Under the Commerce Clause, 64 U. CIN. L. REV.
1471, 1492 (1996) (same); Dissinger, supra note 19, at 508 (same); Linda Greenhouse,
High Court Kills Law Banning Guns in a School Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al
(noting that Lopez "marked a sharp departure from the modern Supreme Court's expan-
sive view of congressional power to regulate commerce"). Prior to Lopez, Carter v. Carter
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student was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm 146 under the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.14' The Act imposed criminal liabil-
ity on anyone found to "knowingly possess a firearm" in a school zone.48
Lopez appealed his conviction, arguing that the Act exceeded the scope
of Congress's commerce power.49
The Lopez Court found that the activity in question fell within the
category of regulation having a "substantial relation" to interstate com-
merce.5 0  Prior to analyzing Lopez under this category, however, the
Court held that once a rational basis could be established for enacting
the regulation in question, the proper standard of review in such cases
was whether an activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce.15' By
using this standard, the Lopez Court refused to acquiesce to Congress's
expansion of its regulatory authority."' The Court found that the con-
nection between violence in schools and interstate commerce was too
remote to fall within Congress's commerce power.5 3 Furthermore, the
Court noted that to find a substantial connection to interstate commerce
would open the floodgates to congressional regulation of all areas of
life.
5 4
Despite this decision, many federal courts have upheld civil and crimi-
nal congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause by distin-
Coal Co. invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 as exceeding Con-
gress's commerce power, and was the last case to overrule congressional commerce regula-
tion. See 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); see also Dissinger, supra note 19, at 508 n.19. In Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court invalidated a federal statute governing employee wages
and hours. See 426 U.S. at 851-52. The Court overruled National League of Cities nine
years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 531
(1985). See supra note 141 (discussing the National League of Cities and Garcia cases).
146. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
147. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (1994).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
149. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
150. See id. at 559. See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937) (discussing federal regulation of intrastate activities based on the activities'
"close and intimate relation to interstate commerce").
151. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. In other decisions, the Court held that the activity
must only "affect" interstate commerce to be regulated by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) ("[W]e must defer to a congressional
finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce.").
152. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 567-68.
153. See id. at 567-68. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that,
"[tlhe possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that
might... substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 567.
154. See id. at 564. The Court opined that if it accepted the purported reasoning sup-
porting the Act, "it [would be] difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power." Id.
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guishing them from Lopez.' Other federal courts, however, have cho-
sen to follow Lopez and invalidate regulations not having a sufficient
connection to interstate commerce."' The latest judicial challenge to the
commerce power questions the constitutionality of the civil rights provi-
sion of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act.
15 7
II. QUESTIONING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Congress adopted the Violence Against Women Act in 1994 as Title
IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.'58 The Act
criminalizes interstate domestic violence and provides a civil remedy for
those injured under the Act.5 9 The civil rights provision states that travel
155. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., No. 96-2316, 1997 WL
785529, at *26 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (upholding the civil rights provision of VAWA as
constitutional under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1379
(7th Cir.) (upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act as a valid exercise of
the commerce power), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996); United States v. Coleman, 78
F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir.) (upholding a federal anti-carjacking statute because auto theft has
been rationally connected to interstate commerce), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 230 (1996);
United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding a federal statute
that makes the transfer and possession of machine guns a federal crime); Doe v. Doe, 929
F. Supp. 608, 615 (D. Conn. 1996) (distinguishing the Lopez decision and holding the 1994
Violence Against Women Act as a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce
power); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1036-37 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (authorizing
the federal regulation of child support payments).
156. See United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328, 330 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (en-
dorsing the limited approach employed by Lopez); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64
F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on Lopez to hold that there was no nexus be-
tween commerce and an activity when the activity had only a "remote and indirect effect
on interstate commerce").
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994); see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic &
State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801 (W.D. Va. 1996) (invalidating the civil rights provision
of VAWA as an improper exercise of Congress's commerce power), rev'd, No. 96-2316,
1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997); Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 617 (upholding the civil
rights provision of VAWA under the Commerce Clause).
158. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). The Act provides for a civil cause of action, and
reads:
(c) Cause of action. A person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this
section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of com-
pensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other
relief as a court may deem appropriate.
Id. The text of subsection (b) provides that:
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence. All persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender
(as defined in subsection (d) of this section).
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across state lines with the intent to harm one's spouse or partner, or
causing, by either duress or coercion, a spouse or partner to cross state
lines under the fear of abuse, is a criminal offense and gives rise to a pri-
vate cause of action."'6 The Act also provides $1.6 billion in federal funds
for spending over a six-year period to combat violence against women."'
Just two years after its enactment, two federal courts addressed the con-
stitutionality of the civil rights provision of the 1994 Violence Against
Women Act under Congress's commerce power."'2
A. Doe v. Doe: In Praise of Congressional Intervention
United States District Judge Janet Bond Arterton first addressed the
constitutionality of the civil rights provision of VAWA in Doe v. Doe.'63
In Doe, a Connecticut woman sued her husband under the civil rights
provision of VAWA6" alleging that he had deprived her of her right to
be free from gender-based violence. 6 1 In the civil suit, Jane Doe alleged
Id. § 13981(b); see supra note 32 (providing text of § 13981(d)(1)).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a) (1994). The Act lists offenses as:
(1) Crossing a state line. A person who travels across a State line or enters or
leaves Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's
spouse or intimate partner, and who, .... intentionally commits a crime of vio-
lence and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall
be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(2) Causing the crossing of a state line. A person who causes a spouse or in-
timate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave Indian country by force,
coercion, duress, or fraud and, in the course or as a result of that conduct, inten-
tionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to the per-
son's spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
Id.; see also United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding the valid-
ity of § 2261(a)).
161. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg to 3796gg-1 (1994). Congress allocated the funds for: (1)
community support programs, 42 U.S.C. § 10418; (2) rape education and prevention, id.
§ 300w-10; and (3) temporary monetary relief for victims of domestic violence, id.
§ 10402(a)(1).
162. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., No. 96-2316, 1997 WL
785529, at *12 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997), rev'g 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996); Doe, 929 F.
Supp. at 610.
163. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). Both the plaintiff and the defendant assumed
pseudonyms for the purpose of the court proceedings. See id. at 610 n.1; see also Gold-
scheid & Kraham, supra note 30, at 514-15 (recognizing that despite the federal rule re-
quiring the inclusion of the names of parties in pleadings, courts may allow parties to pro-
ceed under pseudonyms in sensitive cases).
164. See supra note 32 for the text of the civil rights provision.
165. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610. This case marked the first suit by a wife against her
husband under VAWA. See Mark Pazniokas, Wife Files Suit for 'Gender Violence,'
HARTFORD COURANT, May 14, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 4369235. Jane Doe
sued for an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages. See id.; see also
RAQUEL KENNEDY BERGEN, WIFE RAPE: UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE OF
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that her husband's continuous and systematic abuse over a seventeen-.... 166
year period caused pain, suffering, and physical injuries.
In his defense, John Doe claimed that Congress lacked the authority to
create this cause of action under the Commerce Clause.167 First, he ar-
gued that Lopez overruled the rational basis test for determining
whether congressional action could be upheld under the Commerce
Clause. Second, he contended that, if applicable, VAWA failed the ra-
tional basis test because gender-based violence was not sufficiently tied
to interstate commerce. 69 Finally, the defendant argued that VAWA
improperly federalized traditional areas of state control.17° The court
disagreed, holding that Congress acted within its authority in creating a
federal cause of action for gender-based violence.'
1. Maintaining a Rational Basis Test
To determine the constitutionality of the civil rights provision of
VAWA, the Doe court applied the two-prong rational basis test, asking
whether there was a rational basis for congressional action and whether
the means chosen were "reasonably adapted" to achieve the desired re-
sult."'72 Though the court rejected the defendant's argument that Lopez
SURVIVORS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 1-7 (1996) (providing an in-depth discussion of the
history of "wife rape"); Stopping Sexual Assault in Marriage: A Guide for Women, Coun-
selors and Advocates (Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, N.Y., 2d ed.), 1990, at
5-6 (summarizing state and federal marital rape laws).
166. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610. The complaint accused John Doe of ".throwing [his
wife] to the floor, kicking her, throwing sharp and dangerous objects at her, [and] threat-
ening to kill her." Id. Jane Doe alleged that her now estranged husband forced her to live
and work in "slave-like" conditions, and required her to lay out clothes for him to wear
during his dozens of extramarital affairs. See id.; see also Pazniokas, supra note 165, at Al,
available in 1996 WL 4369235. The complaint further alleged that when Jane Doe told her
husband she planned to leave him, he imprisoned her in their house and repeatedly
threatened her with a shotgun, shouting, "I'm going to [expletive] kill you... I'm going to
[expletive] bury you." Id. When Jane Doe finally escaped from their house, John Doe
chased her down and threw her against a car. See id.; see also BERGEN, supra note 165, at
43 (describing instances where women are kidnapped by their partners and raped or bat-
tered).
167. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610. The defendant also claimed Congress lacked the
authority to enact VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
168. See id. at 613.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 615-16.
171. See id. at 617.
172. See id. at 612; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981) (emphasizing that the Court must defer to congressional find-
ings if they are supported by a "rational basis"); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
303-04 (1964) (employing the rational basis test to uphold the validity of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-
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overruled the rational basis test, the Doe court did recognize the impor-
tance of limiting the reach of the commerce power, in order to avoid in-
fringing upon states' rights.17 ' After finding the rational basis test appli-
cable, the court rejected the defendant's contention that Congress lacked
the authority to pass VAWA under its commerce power.14
2. Finding a Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
The Doe court held that the congressional findings "qualitatively and
quantitatively" demonstrated that gender-based violence had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce, clearly providing a rational basis for
congressional action.1 75 The court distinguished Lopez by giving great
weight to both the findings contained in the final reports of the Senate
and House of Representatives.1 76 The court further distinguished Lopez
by noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez relied
primarily on theoretical arguments rather than statistical findings con-
177cerning the potential impact of guns in schools on interstate commerce.
The Doe court found that the statistical evidence Congress relied on in
passing VAWA, specifically, the civil rights provision, left no doubt
about the possible effects of gender-based violence on interstate com-
merce. 7' Thus, the Doe court could rely on specific factual findings of
Congress to support a finding of a rational basis for the regulation."'
62 (1964) (same).
173. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613 (acknowledging Lopez's recognition of commerce
power limits, but finding that Lopez reaffirmed the rational basis test).
174. See id. at 610 (holding that Congress had a rational basis for enacting VAWA and
that the legislation was "narrowly tailored and reasonably adopted to accomplish a consti-
tutionally permitted end").
175. Id. at 613. In distinguishing VAWA from the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the
Doe court found that the congressional testimony and reports clearly supported a connec-
tion to interstate commerce. See id. at 613-14.
176. See id. The Senate committee found that gender-based crimes restricted move-
ment, reduced employment and consumer spending, and increased health care costs, all of
which affected interstate commerce. See id. at 613 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54
(1993)). The House of Representatives conference found that gender-motivated violence
reduced the amount of interstate travel, affecting interstate spending and interstate em-
ployment. See id. at 613-14 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
177. See id. at 613 (finding that the Act invalidated in Lopez lacked any congressional
findings regarding the effect of guns on interstate commerce).
178. See id. at 614. The court stated that "because of the extensive compilation of
data, testimony, and reports on which Congress based its findings, this Court is not left to
speculate or 'pile inference upon inference to perceive an explicit connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce."' Id. (quoting United States v. Sage, 906 F.
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In determining whether gender-based violence substantially affected
interstate commerce, the Doe court, relying on Wickard v. Filburn's cu-
mulative effect reasoning,'8 held that although interstate commerce
might not be substantially affected by the non-participation of one survi-
vor of gender-based violence, the repetitive prevention of women na-
tionwide from participation and movement in society would substantially
impact commerce. 8' Doe thereby rejected the notion that Lopez elimi-
nated such an aggregate theory.
182
Drawing further support for its position, the court in Doe noted that
since the Lopez decision, many federal courts had upheld a variety of
congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause. 183 Although the
Supreme Court found the statute in question in Lopez unconstitutional,
the Doe court noted that federal courts have held that similar statutes
were constitutional when properly supported by congressional findings9
3. Negating a Claim of Infringement on States' Rights
In addressing the defendant's final claim, the Doe court held that
VAWA's civil rights remedy did not improperly infringe upon states'
rights.'5 Doe emphasized that unlike state criminal statutes, a federal
civil remedy makes offenders personally responsible to their victims.' 86
180. See id. (comparing the effect a sole survivor of domestic violence has on interstate
commerce with the effect produced by a sole wheat harvester). In Wickard, the Supreme
Court held that while the activities of one wheat farmer may not substantially affect inter-
state commerce, similar activities by several farmers would create a cumulative result that
clearly would affect interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128
(1942); supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Wickard holding).
181. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614; cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303 (1964)
(holding that a restaurant's refusal to serve black customers would have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce and the national economy).
182. Cf. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14 (acknowledging the Lopez holding, but applying
the Wickard standard). For a discussion of the effect the Lopez decision had on the
Wickard aggregation principle, see Arkin, supra note 18, at 1598.
183. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615. The court listed 11 civil and criminal statutes that
were upheld after Lopez. See id.; see also United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1379
(7th Cir.) (upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 507 (1996); United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a
cocaine distribution conspiracy statute based on congressional findings that local narcotics
activity substantially affects interstate commerce); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518,
1521-22 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding a law that criminalizes the possession and distribution
of machine guns); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1034-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 constitutional because failure to pay
child support substantially affects interstate commerce).
184. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615.
185. See id. at 616.
186. See id. Doe further stated that VAWA's civil rights remedy complemented state
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Noting that victims of gender-motivated crimes may bring assault and
battery tort claims in state courts,187 the Doe court stressed that nothing
precludes victims from pursuing other causes of actions; rather, VAWA
merely provides an additional federal civil rights remedy.
In conclusion, the Doe court found the means utilized by Congress rea-
sonably adapted to the goal of establishing a civil rights remedy for vic-
tims of gender-based crimes, which substantially affect interstate com-
merce.189  Therefore, the court in Doe found that the Constitution
authorized Congress, under its commerce power, to enact the civil rights
provision of VAWA.' 90
B. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University: Connecting
Civil Rights and the Commerce Clause
One month after the decision in Doe, a Federal District Court in Vir-
ginia reached an opposite result when considering the constitutionality of
VAWA's civil rights provision.9 ' The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed
the district court's ruling and found that Congress acted within its com-
merce power in passing the civil rights provision of VAWA.' 9' In
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University, 93 a female Virginia
Tech student brought a civil complaint under VAWA against two male
students alleging a violation of her right to be free from gender-based
violence.'9 Christy Brzonkala, a freshman student-athlete, accused two
university football players of sexual assault and rape.'9 ' Brzonkala al-
law by "recognizing a societal interest in ensuring that persons have a civil right to be free
from gender-based violence." Id.
187. See id.
188. See id.; see also Hallock, supra note 27, at 595 (categorizing VAWA as providing
victims of gender-based violence with an additional forum for judicial relief).
189. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 617.
190. See id. at 616.
191. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801 (W.D.
Va. 1996) (finding the civil rights provision of VAWA to be an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress's commerce power), rev'd, No. 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec. 23,
1997).
192. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., No. 96-2316, 1997 WL
785529, at *26 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997).
193. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir.
Dec. 23, 1997).
194. See id. at 781-82.
195. See id. at 781. Brzonkala accused James Crawford and Antonio (Tony) Morrison
of sexual assault and rape. See id. In an amended complaint, Brzonkala brought addi-
tional claims against Virginia Tech, William Landsidle, comptroller of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, and Cornell Brown, another university football player. See id. In a separate
opinion, the district court dismissed the charges against Virginia Tech, Landsidle, and
Brown. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772, 779 (W.D.
1997]
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leged that after she had verbally denied their demands for sex, the twoS196
men raped her in a dormitory bedroom. Brzonkala failed to receive• 197
adequate remedial relief from either the university or the criminal jus-
tice system. 98 She filed an $8.3 million civil suit under VAWA.'9
Va. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-1814, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997). The university did
not charge Brown, a first-team All-American defensive end for the Hokies during the 1995
season or subject him to a criminal investigation. See Virginia Tech Football Players Not
Indicted for Alleged Rape, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1996, at D3 [hereinafter Players Not In-
dicted]. In dismissing the charges against Virginia Tech, the district court stated that
Brzonkala failed to adequately support her allegations of gender-bias by the university.
See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 777; see also Va. Tech Dismissed From Rape Lawsuit;
Judge: Discrimination Claim Unsupported, WASH. POST, May 8, 1996, at D6. But see
Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *5-12 (reversing the lower court and finding that
Brzonkala presented sufficient evidence to bring a Title IX claim against Virginia Tech).
196. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782. Brzonkala alleged that after talking with
Morrison and Crawford for less than half an hour, Morrison asked to have sex with her.
See id The complaint alleged that Brzonkala verbally denied Morrison's request twice.
See id. When Brzonkala attempted to leave the dormitory room, Morrison forced her
onto the bed and raped her, pinning his knees against her legs and forcing her to submit to
vaginal intercourse. See id. Again, Brzonkala attempted to escape. See id. Crawford
then entered the room, and raped Brzonkala. See id. Before Brzonkala could recover,
Morrison raped her a second time. See id. Following the third rape, Morrison told
Brzonkala, "You better not have any fucking diseases." Id. Sometime after these events,
but prior to any formal hearing, Morrison announced to a group of students in the dining
hall that, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." Id. Neither Crawford
nor Morrison knew Brzonkala prior to the night of the attack. See id..
197. See id. Seven months after the incident, Brzonkala filed a complaint with Vir-
ginia Tech under the university's sexual assault policy. See id. A student judicial hearing
committee found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him from the university
for two semesters. See id.; see also Athelia Knight, Va. Tech Asks for Dismissal of Stu-
dent's Civil Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1996, at H4. The committee lacked sufficient
evidence against Crawford. See Brzonkala,,935 F. Supp. at 782. Morrison appealed the
committee's decision and a second hearing committee found him guilty of the lesser
charge of abusive conduct. See id. Morrison appealed the second decision to the univer-
sity provost. See id. Without discussing the resulting decision with Brzonkala or providing
her with any notice, the university provost vacated the suspension and permitted Morrison
to return to campus. See id. After reading in a newspaper that Morrison would be re-
turning to Virginia Tech, Brzonkala, fearing for her safety, refused to return to the univer-
sity that fall. See Knight, supra, at H4. Brzonkala transferred to George Mason Univer-
sity in Fairfax, Virginia. See Nina Bernstein, Civil Rights Lawsuit in Rape Case Challenges
Integrity of a Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at Al.
198. See Michael D. Shear, Judge Rejects U.S. Law for Abuse Victims: Allowing
Women to Sue Ruled Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, July 30, 1996, at Al. After two
months of state police investigation, a grand jury failed to deliver indictments against Mor-
rison and Crawford. See Players Not Indicted, supra note 195, at D3. Since the alleged
altercation between Crawford and Brzonkala, police arrested Crawford on other rape
charges. See Angie Watts, Va. Tech Players Arrested: Edmonds, Crawford Deny Rape
Charges, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at El.
199. See Bernstein, supra note 197, at Al. According to Brzonkala's attorney, Eileen
N. Wagner, $8.3 million is a symbolic figure. See id. The figure represented the amount
Virginia Tech collected from its football team's participation in the 1995 Sugar Bowl. See
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1. The District Court: Disallowing Congressional Regulation of
Gender-Based Crimes
In Brzonkala, district court Judge Jackson L. Kiser' °° held that
VAWA's civil rights provision was an unconstitutional exercise of the
Commerce Clause.20' The district court questioned whether Brzonkala's
allegations that the attack was gender-motivated entitled her to a cause
of action under VAWA,20' and whether this provision of VAWA was
constitutional under Congress's commerce power.23 Finding the rape to
id.
200. One of Judge Kiser's more well-known decisions was United States v. Virginia, in
which he upheld the exclusion of female students from the all-male, Virginia Military In-
stitute. See 852 F. Supp. 471, 484 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995);
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). In an opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the
Supreme Court reversed his decision, holding that such a policy violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,
2287 (1996).
201. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801.
202. See id. at 784. The court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test, man-
dated by Congress when it passed VAWA, to analyze whether gender motivated the at-
tack. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50 (1991)). Some of the circumstances triers-
of-fact consider include: "language used by the perpetrator; the severity of the attack...;
the lack of provocation; previous history of similar incidents; absence of any other appar-
ent motive ... ; common sense." S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50 n.72. Focusing on several key
facts, the court found that Brzonkala's claim was valid under the gender animus provision
of VAWA. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 785. First, Judge Kiser noted that the attack
involved a gang rape, which generally is considered more egregious than a one-on-one
rape because it suggests "a conspiracy of disrespect for that woman." Id. at 784 (emphasis
added). Second, Judge Kiser held that the alleged rape resembled a stranger rape moti-
vated by gender animus. See id. at 784-85. Unlike stranger rapes, according to the court,
acquaintance or date rapes more often involve misunderstandings or escalated sexual pas-
sion between the parties. See id. at 785. Finally, the court found the defendants' lack of
personal knowledge of the victim indicative of a random act of gender-based violence,
rather than an act specifically geared toward one particular victim. See id. Judge Kiser
distinguished the rape of Brzonkala from acquaintance rape, noting that acquaintance
rape could be motivated by a personal animus toward the victim as a person, not necessar-
ily as a woman. See id.
As to Morrison, the court took specific notice of his language subsequent to the assault.
See id. The court found that the derogatory nature of Morrison's remarks indicated a
clear disrespect for all women, not just Brzonkala. See id. Furthermore, Morrison
bragged about the violent nature of his sexual encounters, indicating a pattern of abusive
behavior and disrespect for women. See id. In statements following the assault, Morrison
displayed a preference toward intercourse with intoxicated women. See id. The parties
disagreed as to whether Brzonkala was intoxicated at the time of the alleged assault. See
id. at 782, 785. Morrison's description of his sexual preferences, however, provided "[a]
reasonable inference that Brzonkala was intoxicated at the time of [the attack]." Id. at
785. Applying these facts under the totality of the circumstances test, the court found the
allegations in the complaint met the minimum federal pleading requirements describing a
gender-based motivation for the attack. See id.
203. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783. The defendants also challenged the constitu-
tionality of VAWA under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
19971
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be gender-motivated, the court focused on the constitutionality of
VAWA as enacted under Congress's commerce power.04
The district court in Brzonkala failed to find a connection between
gender-based violence and interstate commerce sufficient to support
Congress's exercise of its commerce power."' The court acknowledged
that although congressional findings are helpful in determining constitu-• 206
tionality, they are not conclusive, for the ultimate determination of
constitutionality belongs to the judiciary, not the legislature.0 7 Based on
Brzonkala's similarities to Lopez, the district court found the civil rights
provision of VAWA unconstitutional under Congress's commerce
208power.
at 793. The Enforcement Clause issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
204. See id. at 785. First, the district court outlined the three areas of interstate com-
merce Congress may regulate. See id. at 786 (noting Congress's authority to regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as activities having a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce); see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing in detail the three permissible areas of congressional commerce power regulation).
Next, the court dismissed any contention that VAWA fell within either of the first two
categories of regulation in that VAWA regulated neither a channel nor instrumentality of
interstate commerce. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 786. The district court thus concen-
trated its analysis on the third category of regulation, presuming that Congress justified its
enactment of VAWA under its power to regulate activities having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. See id. (analyzing whether Congress sought to regulate activities
with substantial effects on interstate commerce).
The district court analogized VAWA to the Gun-Free School Zones Act by dividing
United States v. Lopez into four areas of analysis: (1) the nature of the regulated activity;
(2) the jurisdictional requirements as related to an individual activity; (3) the relevance of
legislative history; and (4) the practical implications of enforcing the Act. See Brzonkala,
935 F. Supp. at 786-87. The Lopez Court concentrated its analysis on areas three and four.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-68 (1995). Focusing on the similarities be-
tween VAWA and the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Brzonkala district court noted
that both statutes attempted to regulate non-commercial activities. See Brzonkala, 935 F.
Supp. at 791. Based on Lopez, the district court found that an activity's economic nature
was important to the analysis of the regulation of interstate activity. See id. Next, the
Brzonkala district court noted that, similar to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, VAWA
lacked a jurisdictional provision limiting causes of action to those involving interstate
commerce. See id. at 792. The court stated that until the need for a jurisdictional element
is determined, decisions should favor limiting the federal government's regulatory power
through such a mechanism. See id.
205. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
206. See id. at 789.
207. See id. at 788-89.
208. See id. at 801. See generally Chris A. Rauschl, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic and State University: Violence Against Women, Commerce, and the Fourteenth
Amendment-Defining Constitutional Limits, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1601 (1997) (discussing
the facts and outcome of the case under both a Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment analysis).
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2. The Fourth Circuit: Using Congressional Findings to Connect
Gender-Based Violence and Interstate Commerce
On December 23, 1997, the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Kiser's deci-
sion and found that VAWA's civil rights provision was, in fact, constitu-
209tional under the Commerce Clause. In Brzonkala, the Fourth Circuit
began its analysis by emphasizing that every legislative enactment is enti-
tled to a presumption of validity, and should be given deference."" The
court recognized that the judiciary should not second-guess decisions
based on years of testimony and congressional research,21 but rather,
simply should review that particular exercise of congressional power.2 12
In so finding, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed a rational basis review as the
211proper standard.
The Fourth Circuit found that the existence of congressional findings
does not provide guarantees of constitutionality, but rather, "a court
must defer to congressional findings when there is a rational basis for
such a finding., 21 4 The court restated the text of congressional findings
and, in particular, the fact that the House of Representatives concluded
that "crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse
209. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., No. 96-2316, 1997 WL
785529, at *26 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997). Before discussing the Commerce Clause issue, the
Fourth Circuit addressed the defendants' contention that Brzonkala failed to show that a
"crime of violence motivated by gender" had occurred. Id. at *13; see supra note 32
(quoting VAWA's statutory definition of gender motivation). The Fourth Circuit noted
that the standard for evaluating gender motivation was the same standard as that used in
sex or race discrimination cases and that judges need only to apply a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *13; supra note 202 (listing the fac-
tors to be utilized by the trier-of-fact when making a totality of the circumstances determi-
nation concerning gender-motivation). In reapplying the same factors used by the district
court to determine if Brzonkala had stated a claim, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's analysis in this area. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *14. Like the district
court, the court of appeals considered the language used by Morrison and Crawford, both
during and after the attack, the brutality of the attack itself, and "the absence of any 'ap-
parent motive"' for the attack. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 n.61 (1993)).
210. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *15; see also Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736
F.2d 946, 955 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing support for the strong presumption of validity of fed-
eral statutes).
211. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *15.
212. See id. Furthermore, congressional legislation should not be invalidated unless
compelling constitutional reasons exist for such action. See id.
213. See id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
214. Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *17 (internal quotations omitted). Adopting a
straightforward approach, the Fourth Circuit stated, "[o]ur task is simply to discern
whether.., violence against women-substantially affect[s] interstate commerce." Id. at
*19 (internal quotations omitted).
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effect on interstate commerce. '  In reviewing the extensive congres-
sional findings surrounding the passage of VAWA, the court, without
hesitation, found that Congress had a rational basis to enact the civil
rights provision of VAWA.216
Like the district court, the Fourth Circuit also compared VAWA to the
Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, but reached a different
conclusion."' First, the court noted that at the time of the enactment of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress had not made any findings to
support the legislation. In comparison, when Congress enacted
VAWA it had shown "exhaustive" and "meticulous" support of the leg-
219islation through congressional findings. Second, the court focused on
the fact that the Gun-Free School Zones Act attempted to intervene into
220areas of state control. VAWA, by contrast, provides an additional fed-
eral remedy to existing state laws.22' The court noted that Congress, in an
attempt to "harmonize" VAWA with existing state law, explicitly ex-
empted certain areas of state control through the language of the stat-
22ute. Third, the court noted that civil rights is an area of legislation
which traditionally has been regulated by the federal government, not
the individual states.223
Next, the court addressed the defendants' contention that the civil
rights provision of VAWA is unconstitutional because the Act regulates
non-economic activity, and, therefore, cannot be connected sufficiently
to interstate commerce. 2 ' The Fourth Circuit, however, noted the de-S •. 225
fendants' erroneous reading of the Lopez holding. The correct reading
215. Id. at *18 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
216. See id. at *20; see also supra notes 27-28, 34 for the text of the congressional find-
ings upon which the Fourth Circuit relied.
217. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *21-22.
218. See id. at *21; infra note 255 (noting that, by the time Lopez reached the Supreme
Court, statistical findings had been demonstrated).
219. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *18. Unlike the Lopez Court, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Brzonkala was not required to "pile inference upon inference" to connect gender-
motivated crimes to interstate commerce. See id. at *21. But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
220. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *22.
221. See id. ("Nothing in Title III prevents a victim of gender-based violence from
bringing state criminal charges or pursuing state tort remedies, or affects how the state
treats those claims.").
222. See id. (listing divorce or child custody proceedings).
223. See id. (noting that regulation is particularly appropriate when state attempts to
protect gender-based violence prove inadequate). The Fourth Circuit emphasized that
civil rights long had been "a quintessential area of federal expertise." Id. at *23.
224. See id.
225. See id. Although Morrison and Crawford conceded at the circuit level that Lopez
does not require that an activity be economic in nature in order for regulation to occur,
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of Lopez, that regulation may occur as long as the activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, supports the validity of the civil rights provi-
sion." The Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala held that VAWA "regulates an
activity that is 'an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activ-* •,22 228
ity'''227 and which substantially affects interstate commerce. The Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision, 29 and held that Congress
had a rational basis to enact the civil rights provision of VAWA.23 °
In stark contrast to the majority opinion, Judge Luttig filed a dissent-
ing opinion unreservedly endorsing the district court's decision. 1 Judge
Luttig criticized the majority for failing to conduct an independent
evaluation of the effect of gender-based violence on interstate com-
merce,212 by instead relying completely on congressional findings 3.2 " The
dissent argued that by relying on these findings, the majority treated
Congress's opinions as "dispositive of the constitutional inquiry. 234 In
conducting his own independent review, Judge Luttig agreed with the
the defendants overlooked the basic finding in Lopez. See id. The Lopez Court invali-
dated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, not because the Act attempted to regulate a non-
economic activity, but because the activity did not substantially effect interstate com-
merce. See id.; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-65.
226. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *24. But see Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at
*30 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Brzonkala majority treated Lopez as an "ab-
erration" and "as if [it] were never decided").
227. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit relied, in
part, on precedent established in Wickard and the Civil Rights Cases. See id.; see also su-
pra notes 121-22 (discussing the Court's analysis in Wickard), 126-40 (discussing the Civil
Rights Cases).
228. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *26. The defendants also argued that to up-
hold VAWA's civil rights provision under a Commerce Clause analysis would be to
authorize congressional regulation in any area, including "diet and exercise habits." See
id. at *25. The Fourth Circuit stated that such an argument "belittles the seriousness of
the national problem that discriminatory violence against women presents." Id.
229. See id. at *26.
230. See id. at *25, *26.
231. See id. at *26 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (calling Judge Kiser's opinion "an excellent
legal analysis" and "abidingly faithful" to Lopez).
232. See id.
233. See id. at *27. After extensively criticizing the majority's reliance on congres-
sional findings, Judge Luttig seemingly contradicted himself by stating that, in at least one
circumstance, the majority's analysis would be "understandable." See id. at *28. The dis-
sent stated: "[W]holesale deference to a committee finding would... be understandable if
that committee had made extensive findings deserving of deference." Id. (emphasis
added). But see supra note 27 (providing the history and results of four years of congres-
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district court and found that the congressional findings surrounding
VAWA failed to support any connection to interstate commerce."'
III. THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISION: FINDING A
SUFFICIENT INTERSTATE COMMERCE CONNECTION
The Supreme Court is likely to confront the constitutionality of
236VAWA within the next several years. Despite the reasoning of the dis-
trict court in Brzonkala, VAWA is different from the Gun-Free School
Zones Act at issue in Lopez. The Supreme Court should not arrive at
the same conclusion as it did in Lopez, and should instead uphold the
constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights provision. Three factors weigh
heavily in favor of the constitutionality of VAWA: (1) congressional
findings support a substantial relation to interstate commerce;237
• • 238
(2) states inadequately combat the problem of gender-based violence;
235. See id. at *28. Judge Luttig takes pains to note that the majority "never men-
tion[ed] that the Senate, as opposed to the House, did not conclude that such violence
substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at *26. Although the Senate may not have
used the exact language "substantially affect" to satisfy Judge Luttig's standard, the Sen-
ate did find that, "[g]ender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes... affect in-
terstate commerce." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993); see also Brzonkala, 1997 WL
785529, at *19 (acknowledging the findings of the Senate); supra notes 150-54 and accom-
panying text (noting that Lopez requires only that an activity substantially affect interstate
commerce).
236. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *30 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (predicting that the
Court will revisit the same Commerce Clause issues from Lopez in the context of VAWA,
stating that "the instant statute pristinely presents the Court with the logical next case in
its considered revisitation of the Commerce Clause"); Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-
Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence
Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1877-78 (1996) (predicting fu-
ture challenges to Commerce Clause enactments until the Court clarifies its holding in
Lopez); Jennifer C. Philpot, Note, Violence Against Women and the Commerce Clause:
Can This Marriage Survive?, 85 KY. L.J. 767, 792-800 (1997) (arguing that the same com-
merce power concerns surrounding the Gun-Free School Zones Act will resurface in a
challenge to the civil rights provision of VAWA); Shear, supra note 198, at Al (reporting
predictions that the Supreme Court will affirm Brzonkala by a vote of five to four); see
also Peter J. Liuzzo, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University:
The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act-Recognizing that Violence Tar-
geted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 393 (1997) (advo-
cating the constitutionality of VAWA under a Commerce Clause analysis); Rauschl, supra
note 208, at 1639 (predicting, incorrectly, that the district court's invalidation of the civil
rights provision would withstand further challenge).
237. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *17-19; Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 613-14
(D. Conn. 1996); Weiss, supra note 31, at 727-31 (reviewing the extensive congressional
findings supporting VAWA).
238. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *23; see also Goldscheid & Kraham, supra
note 30, at 506-07 (discussing the inadequacy of state remedies as one reason for the
promulgation of the civil rights provision).
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and (3) lower courts, applying a long series of Supreme Court Commerce
Clause cases, consistently have upheld congressional statutes similar to
VAWA.239
A. Giving Deference to Congressional Findings
In analyzing the constitutionality of VAWA under the Commerce
Clause, both the Brzonkala and Doe courts focused on congressional
findings concerning gender-motivated violence." Prompted by the Lo-
pez Court's discussion of the lack of congressional findings when the
Court decided that guns in school zones did not substantially affect inter-
state commerce, both Brzonkala and Doe emphasized congressional
findings.14 ' Lopez reaffirmed that the enactment of legislation does not
require congressional findings,4 and that Congress may regulate in the
absence of formal findings.14 The Lopez Court noted, however, that
congressional findings aid the Court in connecting a regulated activity to
interstate commerce.244 The Lopez decision is a clear signal that courts
239. Cf Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *19 (noting that a majority of lower courts
have upheld congressional enactments using a rational basis test). See, e.g., United States
v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of the
1992 Child Support Recovery Act); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 617 (W.D.
Va. 1995) (same), vacated and remanded, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 117
F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Kan.
1995) (same), affd, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 753 (1997); United
States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568, 572 (D. Kan. 1995) (recognizing the Drug-Free
School Zones Act as a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power).
240. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *17-19; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 611; supra notes
27-28 (detailing congressional findings of violence against women that Congress relied
upon when passing VAWA).
241. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995). The Lopez Court did not
rely on congressional findings when making its decision because they did not exist. See id.
The government, in fact, conceded that express findings were absent from the legislative
history of the Gun-Free School Zones Act. See id. at 562. In Brzonkala, the Fourth Cir-
cuit found it "particularly telling" that although Congress enacted VAWA prior to the
Court's decision in Lopez, the congressional findings support the premise that gender-
based violence "substantially affect[s]" interstate commerce. Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529,
at *18 n.10.
242. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63; see also Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *17.
243. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that Congress has no obligation to articulate find-
ings); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (holding that Congress "need [not]
make particularized findings in order to legislate"); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304 (1964) (noting that a lack of congressional findings does not automatically invalidate a
statute (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)); Spence, su-
pra note 3, at 653 (commenting that Congress is not required to articulate specific reasons
for regulation).
244. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (stating that congressional findings could enable the
Court to better evaluate effects on interstate commerce).
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should consider those findings when determining the constitutionality of
legislation. Using the Lopez Court's analysis, both Brzonkala and Doe
found that the congressional findings underlying VAWA sufficiently
connected gender-based violence to interstate commerce.246
In promulgating VAWA, Congress found that gender-motivated vio-
lence meets the standard required for regulation under the Commerce
Clause.247 The Senate concluded:
Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes re-
stricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases
health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of
which affect interstate commerce and the national economy.
Gender-based violence bars its most likely targets-women-
248from full [participation] in the national economy.
Furthermore, fear of gender-motivated violence causes women to de-
cline to work in areas or at certain hours when there is a greater risk ofsuch . , 249
such violence. In addition, the House of Representatives reported that
gender-motivated crimes deter victims from traveling interstate and con-
ducting interstate business transactions. This violence further extends
to increase health care costs and decrease demand for interstate prod-
ucts.
251
The district court in Brzonkala gave little weight to these findings con-
252cerning gender-based violence and its effects on interstate commerce.
245. See id. at 562-63.
246. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *12; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14; supra notes
27-28 (listing congressional findings). But see Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801 (holding the
civil rights provision of VAWA unconstitutional and finding that despite congressional
findings, gender-based violence did not substantially affect interstate commerce).
247. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993).
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); supra note 215 and accompa-
nying text for findings of the House of Representatives.
251. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385. The reasons advanced by Congress in
enacting VAWA were similar to those underlying the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54-55. Deferring to Congress's judgment, the Brzonkala
court noted that civil rights has been an area of federal regulation since shortly after the
Civil War. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *22; supra note 209 (describing how Con-
gress intended the same standard of review for VAWA as for other civil rights legislation).
Even Senator Biden analogized gender-motivated discrimination to race-based discrimina-
tion when advocating the enactment of VAWA's civil rights provision. See Klein, supra
note 23, at 254 n.7 (commenting on Senator Biden's guarantee of protection for victims of
gender-based violence); cf. McElroy, supra note 22, at 74 (noting that both gender and
race-motivated crimes allow for civil rights remedies).
252. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 793, 801
(W.D. Va. 1996) (finding VAWA an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power
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Ignoring factual conclusions that illustrated the economic effects of vio-
lence against women,253 the district court stated that Congress's percep-
tions regarding an activity's effect on commerce, whether positive or
negative, did not bind the court; it is the actual effect, the court argued,
that is determinative.254 The Brzonkala district court erred by failing to
distinguish Lopez on the grounds that the statute in question in Lopez
was unaccompanied by any insightful findings upon which to rely,25  a de-
fect from which VAWA does not suffer."'
In reversing the lower court, the Fourth Circuit, however, properly
embraced congressional findings as the best indicator of the effect of
gender-based violence on interstate commerce. 57 Taking notice of the
specific legislative findings by both the House and the Senate, the Fourth
Circuit allowed the statistical proof to speak for itself.258 Consequently,
the court could easily concur with Congress's judgment.
259
Taking the correct cue from Lopez, the Doe court properly relied on
260
legislative findings to uphold the civil rights provision of VAWA. Doe
despite extensive congressional findings), rev'd, No. 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir.
Dec. 23, 1997).
253. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (listing the many effects of gender-based violence
on interstate commerce). See generally Jean Abbott et al., Domestic Violence Against
Women: Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Department Population, 273 JAMA
1763, 1763-67 (1995) (reporting on the connection between domestic violence and emer-
gency medical care); Lisa Genasci, Violence at Home Affects Workplace, THE REGISTER-
GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Dec. 25, 1994, at 5C (discussing the connection between domestic
violence and job performance and health care).
254. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 789-90. Judge Kiser stated that congressional
regulation must be related to actual effects on commerce, not just effects perceived by
Congress. See id. at 789. Thus, while the Brzonkala district court commended Congress's
ability to draw from prior legislative analysis when enacting regulations, Judge Kiser re-
quired more than an inference of a merely anticipatory effect on interstate commerce. See
id. at 790.
255. See id. at 789-90. Congress adopted findings concerning the connection between
guns in schools and interstate commerce prior to the Supreme Court arguments in Lopez.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 n.4 (1995).
256. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (detailing the many forms in which gender-based
violence affects interstate commerce); supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (detail-
ing the Fourth Circuit's discussion of the importance of congressional findings).
257. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., No. 96-2316, 1997 WL
785529, at *17-19 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997).
258. See id. at *20.
259. See id. See generally Christopher J. Sprigman, Comment, Standing on Firmer
Ground: Separation of Powers and Deference to Congressional Findings in the Standing
Analysis, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1645 (1992) (advocating deference to congressional findings
when interpreting regulations).
260. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614; see also Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and
Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 757, 785 (1996) (suggesting three ways to insure the validation of legislation, in-
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also recognized that Lopez did not rely on substantial congressional
findings because they did not exist.2 6' The court in Doe noted that Con-
gress took care to establish a sufficient connection to interstate com-
merce when it enacted VAWA.262
In the wake of Lopez, the Fourth Circuit and Doe recognized the im-
portance of congressional findings when examining the constitutionality
of congressional exercises of power.163 Thus, both courts found that Con-
gress took sufficient steps to ensure that courts could recognize the con-
nection to interstate commerce.264
B. Complementing State Powers to Provide Additional Remedies
Traditionally, courts view congressional regulations as either infringing
265 266on states' rights or complementing them. When state or federal
cluding the clear enunciation of legislative findings connecting a regulated act to interstate
commerce). Since Lopez, other courts have relied on congressional findings to uphold
federal regulations as constitutional under the Commerce Clause. See United States v.
Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 90 (D. Conn. 1995) (relying on an "abundance" of legislative find-
ings to uphold the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 784 (1997); see also Ronald S. Kornreich, Note, The Constitutional-
ity of Punishing Deadbeat Parents: The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 After United
States v. Lopez, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1117-18 (1995) (discussing the congressional
findings accompanying the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992).
261. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613; see also Friedman, supra note 260, at 758 (noting
that between the circuit court decision and the Supreme Court hearing, Congress adopted
findings concerning the connection between guns in school zones and interstate com-
merce). The congressional findings purported to find a nexus between nationwide firearm
violence and interstate commerce, but were disregarded by the Lopez Court. See id. at
758 & n.4.
262. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14 (discussing congressional findings concerning the
connection between gender-based violence and interstate commerce); Julie Goldscheid,
Will a Vital New Women's Right be Withdrawn?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A20 (out-
lining the documented connection between gender-based violence and interstate com-
merce).
263. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *17-19; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14; see also
supra note 241 (noting that Congress enacted VAWA prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lopez).
264. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *17-19; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14 (support-
ing the use of congressional findings in this type of situation). But see Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
while congressional findings may be helpful, the judiciary must make an independent de-
termination); Wille, supra note 2, at 1088-89 (advocating that courts should not defer to
congressional judgment when determining whether Congress exceeded its power).
265. Cf. Stern, supra note 47, at 645 (noting that in the early years of the nation there
was little desire for "intrusion" by the state or federal governments into commercial regu-
lation).
266. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *22-23 (noting that VAWA does not restrict a
person's ability to bring state claims against an alleged violator); Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616
(noting that VAWA provides an additional remedy for victims of gender-based violence);
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remedies are inadequate, Congress may provide supplemental relief as a
complement to existing legislation.267 Congress's regulation of one aspect
of a broad area of activity does not prohibit the states from regulating
other aspects. 26 Likewise, the existence of state regulation does not pro-
hibit the federal government from providing additional remedies.69
The narrow statutory language of VAWA indicates Congress's intent
to complement states' regulatory powers. 70 Congress explicitly provided• 271
for a civil rights remedy to ensure equal protection of the law. Because
S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991) (stating that VAWA provides a remedy to fill the gaps
of existing state laws); 141 CONG. REC. S1620-21 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Bradley) (advocating collaborative efforts of the federal and state governments to
combat violence against women); Editorial, Violence Against the Constitution, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at A16 (quoting Maryland Representative Constance Morella's
statement that invalidation of VAWA leaves victims at the mercy of the states, where
adequate remedies may not be available). This editorial supported Judge Kiser's opinion,
arguing that no connection existed between violence against women and interstate com-
merce. See id. But see Julie Goldscheid, Letter to the Editor, Congress Was Within Its
Rights to Protect Civil Rights, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at A20 (responding to the
Aug. 7, 1996 editorial and stating that "gender-based crimes such as domestic violence,
rape and sexual assault violate women's civil rights and have a direct impact on interstate
commerce, just like other civil rights laws").
267. See Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence-New State
and Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1532-33 (1993)
(discussing the inadequacy of tort suits in protecting battered women); see also Natalie
Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetuating Vio-
lence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 270-71 (1987) (same); Stephen B. Reed, Note, The
Demise of Ozzie and Harriet: Effective Punishment of Domestic Abusers, 17 NEw ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 337,354 (1991) (same).
268. See supra notes 44-45 (discussing the concept of federalism), 221 and accompa-
nying text.
269. See S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 49 (1991); cf. Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *22 (ad-
vocating a harmonization of federal regulation with existing state laws).
270. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *22; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616; see also Gold-
scheid & Kraham, supra note 30, at 507 (stating that the civil rights provision also com-
plements existing federal law). VAWA not only complements existing state and federal
civil rights laws, but the Act also criminalizes interstate domestic violence and interstate
violation of a protection order. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2262; supra note 23 (discussing
VAWA's full faith and credit provision for protection orders). VAWA's criminal causes
of action supplement rather than supplant existing federal and state criminal causes of ac-
tion. See Pamela A. Paziotopoulos, Violence Against Women Act. Federal Relief for State
Prosecutors, PROSECUTOR, May/June 1996, at 20 (commenting that VAWA's new crimi-
nal causes of action allow federal prosecutors to aid in prosecuting domestic violence
cases). The legislative history of VAWA further indicates that the civil rights remedy also
was intended to complement existing federal civil rights laws. See S. REP. NO. 102-197, at
51.
271. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (noting the inadequacy of exist-
ing laws in protecting survivors of gender-based violence).
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VAWA does not encroach upon states' rights, but complements them, it
272is a proper exercise of Congress's commerce power.
Congress's clear intent was to exclude from VAWA's reach state
criminal law and areas of civil regulation. 7' Furthermore, through
VAWA, Congress intended to combat only those gender-based crimes
that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.274 Under VAWA,
Congress may regulate only gender-motivated crimes.7 1 Specifically,
states will continue to regulate those gender-related actions that do not
have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
C. Steering Away from Lopez and Finding a Connection to
Interstate Commerce
Since Lopez, lower federal courts have distinguished the SupremeCour's "• • 276
Court's decision. Courts have affirmed Congress's ability to regulate
everything from guns and narcotics to beef promotion and research. 77
272. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616; cf. Anita F. Hill, The Paula Problem, NEWSWEEK,
June 9, 1997, at 38 (advocating continued federal regulation of civil rights violations). Hill
stated that, "[s]exual-harassment claims are really about violations of the alleged victims'
civil rights, and there is no better forum for determining and assessing those violations-
and finding the truth-than federal courts." Id. The legislative history of VAWA clearly
supports the belief that federal law can complement state law. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at
49 ("Each and every one of the existing [federal] civil rights laws covers an area in which
some aspects are also covered by State laws.").
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994). Federal jurisdiction excludes "any State law
claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital
property, or child custody decree." Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 48 (rejecting the
notion that the civil rights remedy acts as a "[f]ederal divorce law").
274. See id. § 13981(a); supra note 32 (quoting the text of the civil rights provision of
VAWA); see also supra notes 28, 257-64 and accompanying text (describing the intent of
both the Senate and House of Representatives to regulate only those acts of gender-based
violence having a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
275. See id. § 13981(e)(1). The limitation on regulation under this provision reads:
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action ... for random
acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender.
Id. Furthermore, the statute was not designed to provide a remedy for victims of "random
muggings or beatings in the home or elsewhere." S. REP. No. 102-197, at 48 (1991).
276. See Anisimov v. Lake, No. 97-C-263, 1997 WL 538718, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
26, 1997) (distinguishing Lopez and upholding a claim under VAWA's civil rights provi-
sion); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1434 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (giving deference to con-
gressional findings despite the Lopez decision); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615 (D.
Conn. 1996).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir.) (involving the federal
regulation of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 130
(1996); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding federal
regulation of the sale and possession of narcotics constitutional); Goetz v. Glickman, 920
F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (D. Kan. 1996) (affirming the constitutionality of the Beef Promotion
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Courts continue to uphold congressional regulation in these areas, rather
than strike down the statutes as being too remotely tied to the Com-
278merce Clause, as Lopez suggests.
Based on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brzonkala, the current trend
among lower courts and the weight of Supreme Court precedent, the Su-
preme Court likely would uphold the civil rights provision of VAWAt 279
under the Commerce Clause. A string of cases indicate that Congress
need only establish a rational basis to enact Commerce Clause regula-
tion.280 For example, in upholding the constitutionality of the Child Sup-
and Research Act of 1985).
278. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615. For example, a plethora of lower courts have up-
held the validity of the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, an Act similar in purpose and
effect to VAWA. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding the Child Support Recovery Act constitutional); United States v. Kegel, 916 F.
Supp. 1233 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (same); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn.
1995) (same), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 784 (1997); United
States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (same); United States v. Hampshire,
892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995) (same), affd, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 753 (1997); see also United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(finding the Child Support Recovery Act unconstitutional), rev'd, 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 111 (1997); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex.
1995) (same), rev'd, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Mussari, 894 F.
Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995) (same), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Shroe-
der v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1567 (1997); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360
(D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, Shroeder v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1567 (1997). See generally Kornreich, supra
note 260, at 1089 (discussing the constitutionality of the 1992 Child Support Recovery
Act); Amy E. Watkins, Comment, The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992: Squeezing
Blood From a Stone, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 845 (1996) (same); Rebecca A. Wistner,
Comment, Abusing the Power to Regulate: The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 935 (1996) (same).
279. See Brzonkala, 1997 WL 785529, at *26; Liuzzo, supra note 236 (asserting that if
Lopez is correctly applied, the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of the
civil rights provision of VAWA under the Commerce Clause); Johanna R. Shargel, Note,
In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J.
1849, 1851 (1997) (arguing that VAWA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment); Megan Weinstein, Recent Development, The Violence
Against Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Defending the Act From Constitutional
Challenge, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 131 (1997) (defending the constitutionality
of VAWA).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that Congress had a rational basis for regulating the transfer and possession of machine
guns); United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir.) (utilizing the rational basis test to
uphold the validity of the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 111
(1997); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (following the
same rational basis analysis when determining the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act); United States v. Bramble,
103 F.3d 1475, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997) (using the rational basis test to uphold the Eagle Pro-
tection Act as a valid exercise of the commerce power); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412,
1415-16 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (evaluating the connection between anti-abortion activities and
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port Recovery Act of 1992,28 the court in United States v. Sage22 found
that withholding child support payments results in less spending by the
intended recipients of the funds.283 In today's mobile society, a parent
living in Ohio might owe money to support a child living in Connecti-
cut.284 Failure of the parent to pay causes less spending in Connecticut.""
This simple case of supply and demand substantially affects interstate
commerce, thus providing a rational basis for congressional commerce
power regulation.86
Similarly, the civil rights provision of VAWA survives constitutional
challenge under this analysis by passing the rational basis standard. Us-
ing Congress's findings as a stepping stone, it logically follows that
women who are victims of gender-motivated violence are less likely to
287travel interstate or participate in interstate business transactions. Gen
der-motivated violence restricts these interstate activities. By prohibiting
and discouraging the movement of individuals between states, the na-
tional economy and interstate commerce are substantially affected.28'
Congress took affirmative steps to establish congressional findings
connecting gender-motivated crimes to interstate commerce so that
VAWA would meet the minimum standards required by Lopez.2 9 Yet
interstate commerce), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (1997); cf. United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264, 2295-96 (1996) (affirming the application of rational basis review to sex-based
claims of discrimination); County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176 (1981)
(utilizing a rational basis test when looking at wage discrimination); Doe v. Doe, 929 F.
Supp. 608, 610 (1996).
281. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
282. 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 784 (1997).
283. See id. at 90.
284. This example is an expansion of the possible situation in Sage. Cf id. at 87. The
facts of Sage indicate that after the father who resided in Ohio failed to pay child support
in Connecticut, Ohio authorities issued a warrant for his arrest. See id.
285. See id. at 90.
286. See id. at 92.
287. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14 (relying on congressional findings to uphold the
civil rights provision of VAWA under Congress's commerce power); cf Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (contending that "bias-inspired" crimes "inflict
greater individual and societal harm ... [because they] are more likely to provoke retalia-
tory crimes,... and incite community unrest").
288. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14. (upholding VAWA as a valid exercise of the
commerce power because of the substantial effect gender-based violence has on interstate
commerce); Shargel, supra note 279, at 1850 ("[T]he disabling physical and psychological
effects of violence have kept women from participating as commercial actors, and their
absence from the nation's marketplace has had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.").
289. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the impact of congressional findings on the con-
stitutionality of VAWA).
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the Court, in its current makeup, still may decide that these findings are
too tenuous to adequately support such a connection.290 To hold
VAWA's civil rights provision unconstitutional, however, would require
the Court to revisit the same issues addressed in Lopez and to disregard
its own suggestion that congressional findings aid the Court in drawing
connections to interstate commerce.291 Although uncertainty exists as to
whether the Court would reevaluate the Lopez standard, several years
have passed since the Court's decision in Lopez and the issue may again
be ripe for review.292
IV. CONCLUSION
Violence against women occurs at an alarming rate in the United
States. Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act as a re-
sponse to the increasing amount of gender-based violence. Although
neither VAWA, nor any act of Congress, can categorically stop such
violence, the Act does provide a civil and equitable remedy for survivors
of these crimes which will assist in achieving this goal. The Supreme
Court should uphold the civil rights provision of VAWA as a valid exer-
cise of congressional authority to regulate those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce. The Court should respond to
the growing concerns surrounding gender-motivated violence by up-
holding the civil rights provision of VAWA. In passing the statute, Con-
gress has met the minimum conditions demanded by Lopez-that a stat-
ute be rationally related to an activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce, and use a reasonably adapted means to achieve that end. The
Constitution requires no more, and women deserve no less than the right
to be free from gender-based crimes.
290. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., No. 96-2316, 1997 WL
785529, at *30 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (referring to the Fourth Cir-
cuit majority opinion in Brzonkala by stating, "I suspect that, even in its discretion, the
Supreme Court would not allow today's decision to stand").
291. Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Forgo Opportunity to Expand on Recent Com-
merce-Clause Ruling in Gun Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1995, at A13 (noting that the Court
often "await[s] further developments in the lower courts" before revisiting an issue).
292. See id.; see also United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995) (per curiam).
Decided just days after the Court issued the Lopez decision, Robertson raised an even
more direct issue concerning the effect of an activity on interstate commerce. See Robert-
son, 514 U.S. at 670-71. The Court, without even referencing Lopez, decided that an
Alaskan gold mine was sufficiently connected to interstate commerce simply because it
hired employees from out-of-state. See id. at 671-72. The Roberston opinion indicates the
Court's own reluctance to apply Lopez. See Greenhouse, supra note 291, at A13 (dis-
cussing the conflicting outcomes of the Lopez and Robertson opinions).
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